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THE ASYMMETRY OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Richard H. Seamon*
Abstract: This Article discusses whether a State has sovereign immunity from claims for
just compensation. The Article concludes that the States are indeed immune from just-
compensation suits brought against them in federal court; States are not necessarily immune,
however, from just-compensation suits brought against them in their own courts of general
jurisdiction. Thus, the States' immunity in federal court is not symmetrical to the States'
immunity in their own courts. This asymmetry, the Article explains, is the result of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause obligates a State to
provide a means of paying just compensation every time the State takes private property for
public use. A State may be able to meet this obligation by establishing a non-judicial
compensation system. If a State fails to establish an adequate non-judicial compensation
system, however, the State's remedial obligation under the Due Process Clause falls upon the
State's courts. This resolution respects both a State's constitutional right to avoid private
lawsuits and an individual's constitutional right to just compensation.
The principles of sovereign immunity and just compensation are on a
collision course. The principle of sovereign immunity bars you from
suing an unconsenting State for money.' The principle of just
compensation requires the State to pay you money if it takes your
property for public use.' The question is: Can you sue the State for
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1. See, eg., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 745-49 (1999). A State can consent to suits against it,
thereby waiving its sovereign immunity, and some States have done so for claims seeking just
compensation. See id. at 755 (stating that "sovereign immunity bars suits only in the absence of
consent"). As discussed infra notes 249-59 and accompanying text (Part V.A), however, in many
States the waiver of sovereign immunity from just-compensation claims is unclear or incomplete.
See, e.g., DANIEL t. MANDELKER ET AL, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW § 4A.02[5][d] (1998) (observing
that "in many states the availability of a compensation remedy in land use cases is not clear"). The
issue discussed in this Article is therefore one that can arise in many States. Moreover, the analysis
proposed in this Article has implications outside the context of just-compensation claims against
unconsenting States. See infra notes 260-394 and accompanying text (Parts V.B through V.D).
2. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution says in relevant part, "INjor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This
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money if it takes your property for public use without paying you?
Surprisingly, and contrary to the belief of many commentators, the
United States Supreme Court has never answered that question.
Two principles of symmetry suggest that you cannot sue an
unconsenting State for just compensation. First, the Court's case law
establishes a symmetry between the States' immunity from lawsuits
brought in federal court and their immunity from lawsuits brought in
their own courts.' Because the Court's case law also strongly suggests
that States are immune from just-compensation suits brought in federal
court,5 this symmetry suggests that they are likewise immune from such
suits in their own courts. In addition, the Court's case law suggests that
the immunity of the States is symmetrical to the immunity of the United
States, and that the United States would be immune from just-
compensation claims (had it not waived its immunity from such claims in
the Tucker Act6).7  The symmetry between the States' sovereign
immunity and that of the United States is thus a second symmetry
suggesting that States are immune from just-compensation suits.
Significantly, both of these symmetries-(l) between the States'
immunity in federal court and their immunity in their own courts and (2)
between the States' immunity and that of the United States-underlay
the Court's recent decision in Alden v. Maine,' which held that States are
immune in their own courts, as well as in federal court, from private
actions based on Article I statutes.9 The Court could plausibly rely on
the same symmetries to hold that States are immune from just-
compensation claims in both their own courts and federal court.
This Article argues for a partly contrary conclusion: Unconsenting
States may sometimes be sued for just compensation in their own courts,
though not in federal court. That conclusion rests on the thesis that the
prohibition against certain takings of property without just compensation applies to the States under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 & n.5 (1994).
3. See infra note 19 (citing commentary reading Supreme Court precedent to hold that Just
Compensation Clause overrides sovereign immunity).
4. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (Part lll.B).
5. See infra notes 73-91 and accompanying text (Part IL.B and II.C).
6. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (1998).
7. See infra notes 115-39 and accompanying text (Part IlI.C).
8. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
9. See id. at 712 (describing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), as making clear that
"Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suits
commenced or prosecuted in the federal courts," and holding in the case before it that "the powers
delegated to Congress under Article I ... do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States
to private suits for damages in state courts").
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States' immunity in federal court and their immunity in their own courts
are not symmetrical.' 0  The States' federal-court and state-court
immunities are not symmetrical because of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." The procedural component of the Due Process
Clause imposes on the States remedial obligations that sometimes require
the involvement of the States' own courts.' 2 In particular, the Due
Process Clause requires that, when a State takes private property for
public use, the State must have a "reasonable, certain and adequate"
procedure for paying just compensation. 3 A State may be able to meet
this remedial obligation without involving its courts. For example, a
State may be able to create a procedure under which property owners
seek just compensation from the State's executive or legislative branch.
If a State does not provide an adequate, alternative compensation
procedure, however, the Due Process Clause would require the State to
let itself be sued for just compensation in its own courts of general
jurisdiction. 4 In short, the Due Process Clause could subject an
unconsenting State in its own courts to suits from which it would be
immune in federal court.
This asymmetry reflects the differing roles of the state and federal
courts with respect to a State's due process obligations. When due
process obligates a State to provide a remedy, the State's courts can
enable the State to meet that obligation by providing the remedy. The
federal courts cannot serve that function for the States. Although a
federal court can often remedy a State's violation of the Due Process
Clause, in doing so the federal court is not discharging the State's
obligation to provide a remedy through its own tribunals. Thus, even if a
federal-court remedy is available for a State's violation of the Due
Process Clause, that does not excuse the State's failure to make its own
remedy available. By the same token, the Due Process Clause can require
that a remedy be available in state court, even though that remedy would
not be available in federal court because of sovereign immunity. In sum,
because the federal courts play a different role from that of a State's own
courts in meeting the State's due process obligations, the States'
10. See infra notes 241-48 and accompanying text (Part IV.D).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("[Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.").
12. See infra notes 260-328 and accompanying text (Part V.B).
13. See, e.g., Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194
(1985); see also supra note 181 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 178-248 and accompanying text (Part IV).
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sovereign immunity in federal court and in their own courts can be
asymmetrical.
Although the analysis offered here concerns just-compensation claims
brought against unconsenting States under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the analysis has broader implications. Those
implications flow from this Article's thesis that it is the procedural
component of the Due Process Clause in combination with the Just
Compensation Clause-and not, as some commentators have assumed,
the Just Compensation Clause alone-that overrides sovereign immunity
in some circumstances. The implications of this Article's thesis are
threefold.
First, a State has remedial obligations under the Due Process Clause
not only when it takes private property for public use but also when it
causes other deprivations of people's life, liberty, or property. Those
remedial obligations sometimes entail awards of retroactive monetary
relief from the state treasury, such as for the State's erroneous collection
of taxes. Thus, the Due Process Clause can create asymmetries between a
State's immunity in its own courts and its immunity in federal court
besides the asymmetry related to just-compensation claims.
Second, the federal government has its own remedial obligations under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Under the analysis
proposed here, for example, the federal government has an obligation,
notwithstanding its sovereign immunity, to provide a procedure to pay
just compensation when it takes private property for public use. Thus,
Congress could not repeal the existing Tucker Act remedy for
governmental takings unless an adequate alternative remedy were
available.
Finally, the analysis proposed here clarifies two aspects of Congress's
power to enforce the Due Process Clause against the States under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 First, it clarifies Congress's power to
enforce the remedial obligations imposed on States by the doctrine of
procedural due process. The analysis shows, specifically, that Congress
cannot necessarily enforce those remedial obligations by regulating state
conduct that gives rise to those remedial obligations but that does not
itself violate the Fourteenth Amendment. This is why the Court struck
down a federal statute in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank. 6 The statute at issue there
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article [i.e., this Amendment].").
16. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
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regulated the States' infringement of patents, conduct that could give rise
to remedial obligations under the Due Process Clause but that did not "by
itself violate the Constitution."' 7 Second, Congress's power to enforce
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not depend
on whether or not remedies are available in federal court for the States'
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. As this Article shows, the
availability of federal-court remedies does not excuse a State's failure to
meet its own remedial obligations under the procedural component of the
Due Process Clause. Nor can the availability of federal-court remedies
undo state conduct that violates the substantive components of the Due
Process Clause.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I shows that, contrary to the
view of many commentators, it is an open question whether the just-
compensation principle overrides the principle of state sovereign
immunity. Part II shows that, although that question is open, Supreme
Court precedent virtually compels the conclusion that States are indeed
immune from just-compensation suits brought in federal court. Part III
discusses precedent suggesting that States are likewise immune from
just-compensation suits brought in their own courts. Part IV argues that,
despite the precedent discussed in Part III, the Due Process Clause
sometimes subjects unconsenting States to just-compensation suits in
their own courts. Finally, Part V discusses the implications of Part IV's
due-process analysis.'
17. Id. at 643.
18. I am aware of only one other commentator who has suggested that the Due Process Clause
overrides state sovereign immunity from just-compensation claims, and she did so only in passing
and based on the assumption, rejected in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999), that the States'
immunity in their own courts is a common-law, rather than a constitutional, doctrine. See Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign's Prerogative, 67
TEX. L REV. 685, 763 (1989) (stating that "[a] due process violation ... occurs if plaintiffs are
precluded from litigating whether a given state activity constitutes a taking"); id. at 763-64
(referring to "common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity" applicable in state courts). Other
commentators have discussed, in varying levels of detail, the broader issue of the relationship
between sovereign immunity and the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas
Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1151 n.22,
1171-74 (1984) (arguing primarily that Supremacy Clause requires state courts to adjudicate federal
claims without regard to sovereign immunity, but observing that due process may impose similar
requirement); Ellen D. Katz, State Judges, State Officers, and Federal Commands After Seminole
Tribe and Printz, 1998 WIS. L REV. 1465, 1493 (asserting that, given restrictions on federal-court
jurisdiction on claims against States, principles of due process may create a special obligation on
part of state courts to adjudicate federal claims against the State); see generally Carlos Manuel
Vizquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the Alden Trilogy, 109 Yale L.J. 1927 (2000)
[hereinafter Vfzquez, Alden Trilogy] (discussing Court's federalism decisions from October 1998
Term); Louise Weinberg, The Power of Congress over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995 B.Y.U. L
1071
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I. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS NOT
DECIDED WHETHER SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BARS
CLAIMS AGAINST UNCONSENTING STATES FOR JUST
COMPENSATION
You would think that the U.S. Supreme Court would have decided by
now whether a State can be sued for just compensation without its
consent. Indeed, many commentators think that the Court did decide that
issue in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles. 9 I respectfully submit that those commentators are mistaken.-
REV. 731, 733 n.8, 789 n 189 (stating that "due process ultimately requires state if not federal
jurisdiction" and that "a state court is under special obligation to try a federal claim.., as much [as]
a matter of due process ... as a matter of supremacy"); Michael Wells, Suing States for Money:
Constitutional Remedies After Alden and Florida Prepaid, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 771, 772-83 (2000)
[hereinafter Wells, Suing States] (discussing Supreme Court case law implying that "as a matter of
due process, state courts must be open for certain constitutional claims"); see also Richard H. Fallon,
Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L.
REV. 1731, 1777-1807 (1991) (discussing limits on constitutional remedies, including those
imposed by immunity doctrines); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment,
and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L J. 1, 72-104 (1998) [hereinafter Jackson, The Supreme
Court] (proposing common-law version of sovereign immunity that would permit effective remedies
for state misconduct); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE
L.J. 1683, 1766-1804 (1997) [hereinafter Vdzquez, What Is] (proposing an interpretation of
precedent that would obligate state courts to hear most constitutional claims against state officers);
Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L. REV. 102,
125 (1996) (stating without elaboration that, under Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994), "state
courts must provide adequate relief when state officials deprive persons of their property in violation
of federal law," despite sovereign immunity). In addition, at least one commentator has argued,
mostly for normative reasons, that the Just Compensation Clause of its own force overrides
sovereign immunity. See Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause:
Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277 (1988). As far as I can tell, no
commentary has explored in detail the specific question whether the Due Process Clause overrides
state sovereign immunity from just-compensation claims or the broader question of what
implications an affirmative answer to that question would have for state sovereign immunity. Cf
infra note 19 (citing commentary assuming that the Court has resolved this issue). This Article
attempts to examine those questions in detail. It also, to a more limited extent, addresses the
"complicated" relationship between the sovereign immunity of the States and that of the United
States. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Accommodation by Declaration, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1375, 1379
(2000) (describing this issue as "complicated").
19. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM 379 & n.32 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART
& WECHSLER] (citing First English and Reich as holding that Constitution "requires courts to
provide" remedies for takings, "the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts
notwithstanding"); Scott P. Glauberman, Citizen Suits Against States: The Exclusive Jurisdiction
Dilemma, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 63, 96 n.194 (1997) (citing First English for proposition
that "the state cannot assert sovereign immunity in state court against a takings claim"); Eric Grant,
A Revolutionary View of the Seventh Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause, 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 144, 205 (1996) (asserting that First English makes clear that federal courts can award just
1072
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As a plurality of the Court recently recognized, First English does not
resolve whether "the sovereign immunity rationale retains its vitality" for
claims seeking just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment.2
A. The Holdings of First English
In First English, the Court decided two things. First, the Court held
that, when a land-use regulation has "taken" private property, it is not
enough for a state court to invalidate the regulation prospectively. ' The
Constitution also entitles the landowner to just compensation for the
compensation "without regard to the 'consent' of Congress"); Paul J. Heald & Michael L Wells,
Remedies for the Misappropriation of Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments
Before and After Seminole Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 849, 871-72 (1998) (citing First English for proposition that Just
Compensation Clause "carves out an exception to otherwise applicable rules of sovereign
immunity"); Katz, supra note 18, at 1485 & n.89 (citing First English as holding that state courts
must adjudicate just-compensation claims against the State and that "state courts may not permit
claims of state sovereign immunity to block" awards ofjust compensation); Thomas W. Merrill, The
Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 981 & n.351 (2000) (citingFirst English
for proposition that "the Takings Clause has been held to incorporate a self-executing waiver of state
and federal sovereign immunity against claims for monetary compensation"); Thomas E. Roberts,
Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings Litigation, 11 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L.
37, 57 (1995) (stating that "after First English, no state court is free to reject a compensation award
where a taking is found"); Vfzquez, What Is, supra note 18, at 1709-10 & n.121 (citing First
English for proposition that "the state courts [may not] interpose their own law of sovereign
immunity to bar [just-compensation] claims"); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence,
State Sovereign Immunity and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691, 724
n.126 (2000) [hereinafter Jackson, Seductions] (citing First English for proposition that
"notwithstanding sovereign immunity, the Constitution 'dictates' a remedy for takings of property");
Jackson, The Supreme Court, supra note 18, at 115 & n.454 (stating that First English "strongly
suggests" that States lack sovereign immunity from just-compensation claims in federal court).
20. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Or. State Bd. of Forestry, 991 P.2d 563, 568 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)
(observing that First English "did not squarely present" this issue and admitting that Oregon Court
of Appeals' resolution of the issue in that case "is not beyond dispute"), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1363
(2001); Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-
Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 137-38 (1999) (observing that
Supreme Court "has never held that the [Just Compensation] Clause abrogates either federal or state
sovereign immunity").
21. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 714 (1999) (Kennedy,
J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens & Thomas, J.J.), discussed infra notes 43-51 and
accompanying text (Part I.C).
22. See First English, 482 U.S. at 319 (holding that "[i]nvalidation" of ordinance that caused a
regulatory taking, "though converting the taking into a 'temporary' one, is not a sufficient remedy to
meet the demands of the Just Compensation Clause").
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period during which the regulation was in effect and caused a taking. 23
This holding recognized so-called "temporary regulatory takings. ' 4
Second, the Court held that, when a temporary regulatory taking occurs,
the Just Compensation Clause, of its own force, gives rise to a monetary
cause of action in "inverse condemnation" that is enforceable in state
court.2 ' As the Court put it, the Just Compensation Clause is "self-
executing. Thus, the plaintiff in First English could sue for just
compensation in state court even though there was no state statute or
state case law recognizing a cause of action for temporary regulatory
takings.2 7 It was "not necessary" for state law to create the cause of
action, because it was created by the United States Constitution.
28
Neither of the holdings in First English concerned sovereign
immunity. The first holding resolved a remedial question: What remedy
does the Constitution require for a temporary regulatory taking? 29 That
question can arise whether or not the governmental defendant has
sovereign immunity. Indeed, First English illustrates the point, as the
defendants in that case were units of local government, which the Court
has long held do not share the State's immunity. The second holding
recognized that a cause of action in inverse condemnation arises directly
23. See id. at 321 ("We... hold that where the government's activities have already worked a
taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.").
24. See id. at 313 ("We now turn to the question whether the Just Compensation Clause requires
the govemrnment to pay for 'temporary' regulatory takings.").
25. See id. at 315-16.
26. Id. at 315 (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)); see also Kirby Forest
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 5 n.6 (1984) (noting that, when federal government takes
possession of private property without bringing a condemnation proceeding, property owner's right
to bring inverse-condemnation suit "derives from the self-executing character of the constitutional
provision with respect to condemnation") (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. The state court in First English had dismissed the claim for a regulatory taking on the ground
that California law did not create a cause of action to support the claim. See First English, 482 U.S.
at 308-09; see also Agins v. Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 28-31 (Cal. 1979) (holding, apparently as a
matter of state law, that property owner had no cause of action in inverse condemnation for unduly
burdensome land-use restriction), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
28. First English, 482 U.S. at 315 (quoting Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933)).
29. See id. at 311, 313 (describing this as a "remedial question").
30. See id. at 308 (stating that complaint named county and county flood control district as
defendants); see also Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, , 121 S. Ct. 955, 965 (2001) ("[Tlhe
Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity to units of local government."); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) (treating as well-settled the principle that cities, counties, and other units
of local government are not entitled to sovereign immunity, and implying that this principle applies
to actions brought in state court as well as in federal court).
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from the Constitution when a temporary regulatory taking occurs.31 The
question whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, however, differs
from the question whether the defendant has sovereign immunity. The
failure to distinguish between these two questions is what seems to have
led to the mistaken view among some commentators that First English
decided the immunity issue.
Nonetheless, the Court has repeatedly distinguished the issue whether
the plaintiff has stated a cause of action from the issue whether the
defendant has sovereign immunity from that cause of action. Perhaps the
most famous case differentiating the issues is Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp.32 In Larson, the Court held that sovereign
immunity barred a tort suit against a federal officer.33 The Court rejected
the plaintiff s contention that the officer's commission of a tort precluded
the defense of sovereign immunity.34 That contention, the Court
explained, "confuses the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the
requirement that a plaintiff state a cause of action."'35 Larson is only one
of many cases in which the Court has said that the issue whether the
plaintiff has stated a cause of action and the issue whether the defendant
has sovereign immunity from that cause of action are "analytically
distinct., 36 First English established that a temporary regulatory taking
31. See First English, 482 U.S. at 315 ("We have recognized that a landowner is entitled to bring
an action in inverse condemnation as a result of the self-executing character of the constitutional
provision with respect to compensation.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
32. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
33. Id. at 703.
34. Id. at 691-93.
35. Id. at 692-93.
36. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983) (observing that, although Tucker Act
waived federal government's sovereign immunity, an "analytically distinct" issue was whether
statutes and regulations on which plaintiff relied created right to compensation); see also Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1994) (stating that lower court erroneously
"conflate[d]" the "analytically distinct" issues of whether sovereign immunity had been waived and
whether cause of action for compensation existed); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
63-64 (1989) (treating as separate questions whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 overrode States' federal-
court immunity and whether Section 1983 created cause of action against States); Loeffler v. Frank,
486 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1988) (determining that Congress intended to limit the availability of a cause
of action against a federal agency without limiting scope of statute waiving that agency's sovereign
immunity); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 112 (1984) (relying on Larson
to criticize dissent for confusing issue of whether suit was barred by sovereign immunity with issue
of whether defendants' conduct violated plaintiffs' rights); cf. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S.
669, 684 (1987) (characterizing question of whether Constitution supplies cause of action against
federal official as "logically distinct" from question whether the official has official immunity);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397-98 (1971)
(recognizing difference between issue of whether Constitution created cause of action against
1075
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gives rise to a cause of action for monetary relief, but First English did
not address whether States are immune from that cause of action. 7
B. Sovereign Immunity in First English
The Court in First English did mention sovereign immunity. The
Court did so, however, only to paraphrase an argument by the U.S.Solicitor General as amicus curiae. 38 The relevant passage is in footnote
nine of the opinion and, including the Court's response, is as follows:
The Solicitor General urges that the prohibitory nature of the
Fifth Amendment, combined with principles of sovereign
immunity, establishes that the Amendment itself is only a
limitation on the power of the Government to act, not a remedial
provision. The cases cited in the text, we think, refute the
argument of the United States that "the Constitution does not, of
its own force, furnish a basis for a court to award money
damages against the government." Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 14. Though arising in various factual and
jurisdictional settings, these cases make clear that it is the
Constitution that dictates the remedy for interference with
property rights amounting to a taking.39
This passage makes clear that the Solicitor General was not directly
arguing that sovereign immunity barred just-compensation claims.
officials and issue of whether they were immune from that cause of action under doctrine of official
immunity).
37. Professor Fallon has pointed out to me that the distinction between the existence of a
monetary cause of action and the existence of sovereign immunity is pretty thin in the context of the
Fifth Amendment, where the only defendant against which a cause of action for just compensation
originally could have run was the United States, a defendant otherwise capable of asserting
sovereign immunity. See E-mail from Richard H. Fallon, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, to
Richard H. Seamon, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of S.C. (Jan. 11, 2001) (on file with author). I
agree with that observation but would add that the Court in First English did not seem to rely on the
original understanding of the Fifth Amendment in concluding that it creates a monetary cause of
action. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 782 (1995) (asserting that, under "original
understanding" of Just Compensation Clause, compensation was not required "when government
regulations limited the ways in which property could be used"). This circumstance, coupled with the
fact that the defendants in First English were units of local government that could not claim
sovereign immunity, convinces me that the Court in First English did not intend to address sovereign
immunity. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
308 (1987).
38. See First English, 482 U.S. at 316 n.9.
39. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Instead, he was arguing that, in light of the prohibitory wording of the
Just Compensation Clause and general principles of sovereign immunity,
the Clause should be interpreted only to prospectively nullify
government action that has caused an uncompensated taking of private
property for public use, and not to create a cause of action for retroactive
monetary relief.4" Thus, the Solicitor General's argument was that the
Just Compensation Clause functioned as a limit on governmental power
rather than as the source of a monetary cause of action. Accordingly, the
Court did not mention sovereign immunity in response to the Solicitor
General's argument. Rather, the Court reiterated the point made
elsewhere in its opinion that the Clause itself creates a private cause of
action for a monetary remedy but does not otherwise "limit the
governmental interference with property rights."4  As Professor
Brauneis has accordingly observed, footnote nine of First English
hints-but it only hints, without firmly deciding-that the just-
compensation principle overrides the sovereign-immunity principle.4"
C. Sovereign Immunity in Del Monte Dunes
In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.," a
plurality of the Court again hinted that the just compensation requirement
may override sovereign immunity. At the same time, the plurality
confirmed that the issue is open.
In Del Monte Dunes, the Court held that the plaintiff had a right to a
jury trial in a federal-court action asserting an inverse-condemnation
claim against a city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.44 To justify that conclusion,
the majority had to explain why a right to a jury trial exists in an inverse-
condemnation action under Section 1983 even though there is no right to
a jury trial when the government brings an action to condemn property.45
40. See id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 16-17,
First English (No. 85-1199) (discussing sovereign immunity to support interpreting Just
Compensation Clause as not creating "self-effectuating damage remedy").
41. First English, 482 U.S. at 315.
42. See Brauneis, supra note 20, at 138 (stating that "the reference to sovereign immunity in First
English that some have taken to be an oblique hint about abrogation may be explicable on other
grounds").
43. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
44. Id. at 720-21.
45. See id. at 711-18. But see Grant, supra note 19, at 146, 149 (arguing that the Court's
precedent holding that there is no right to jury trial in condemnation proceeding is "manifestly
wrong" and that the same right applies in inverse condemnation).
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A plurality of the Court (the majority minus Justice Scalia) offered as
one difference between inverse-condemnation actions and direct-
condemnation actions that, in inverse-condemnation actions, the
government often disputes that any "taking" has occurred for which it is
liable, whereas in direct-condemnation actions the government virtually
never disputes its liability for a taking.46 The dissent replied that this
"absence-of-liability" rationale had not actually been used in the cases
denying the right to a jury in direct-condemnation actions.47 Instead, the
dissent observed, courts in those cases often relied on a sovereign-
immunity rationale; they reasoned that the government's power to claim
total immunity from suits for just compensation included the lesser
power to allow such suits without providing a jury.48 In responding to the
dissent, the plurality cited footnote nine of First English:
Even if the sovereign immunity rationale retains its vitality in
cases where th[e] [Fourteenth] Amendment is applicable, cf
First English, 482 U.S. at 316 n.9, it is neither limited to nor
coextensive with takings claims. Rather, it would apply to all
constitutional suits against the Federal Government or the States,
but not to constitutional suits such as this one against
municipalities like the city of Monterey.4 9
The plurality seems to be saying that the old, "sovereign immunity"
rationale does not provide a workable standard for determining when a
right to a jury trial exists. Of greater importance for our purposes, the
plurality suggests doubt about whether sovereign immunity protects
States from just-compensation claims based on the Fourteenth
Amendment." At the same time, the plurality clearly believed the issue
46. See id. at 712 (plurality opinion) (finding "[most important" difference between direct-
condemnation proceeding and property owner's action to redress uncompensated taking under
§ 1983 to be that, "when the government initiates condemnation proceedings, it concedes the
landowner's right to receive just compensation .... Liability simply is not an issue"). Justice Scalia
did not join this part of the plurality opinion because he believed that "all § 1983 actions must be
treated alike insofar as the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial is concerned." Id. at 723 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He therefore did not think that it was appropriate
to focus on the particular features of inverse-condemnation actions brought under Section 1983 to
determine whether there was a right to jury trial in those actions.
47. Id. at 742 (Souter, J., dissenting).
48. Id
49. Id. at 714 (plurality opinion).
50. This expression of doubt will be all the more intriguing to those who like to count votes on the
Court because the doubt is voiced by Justice Kennedy, often a swing vote on issues of federalism.
See Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv
1601, 1652 (2000). In Del Monte Dunes, Kennedy speaks for himself and three other Justices (Chief
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to be open-a belief that it made clear when it asserted something to be
so "[e]ven if... sovereign immunity... retains its vitality."'
D. Immunity vs. Just Compensation: A Conflict Not Yet Resolved
First English did not decide whether the just-compensation principle
overrides the sovereign-immunity principle, and the plurality opinion in
Del Monte Dunes confirms that the issue is unresolved. 2 In misreading
First English as resolving the issue, commentators have ignored the
difference between the issue whether a cause of action exists and the
issue whether a particular defendant has sovereign immunity from that
cause of action. The next Part of this Article demonstrates that, although
the issue is indeed open, the Court's case law strongly suggests that the
Just Compensation Clause does not override the States' immunity in
federal court. The more difficult question of whether unconsenting States
can be sued for just compensation in their own courts is addressed in
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and Thomas), two of whom (the Chief Justice and Justice
Thomas) are usually considered "solid" votes in favor of immunity. See generally Ann Althouse,
The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a Way to Enforce Federalism, 31 RUTGERS LJ. 631, 637-38
(2000) (discussing voting patterns of individual Justices on cases involving federalism). If these
Justices doubt the vitality of sovereign immunity as applied to claims for just compensation, there is
serious doubt indeed whether a majority of the Court would sustain sovereign immunity in the face
of a just-compensation claim.
51. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 714 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). In a personal
communication with the author, Professor Fallon characterized this passage from the plurality
opinion in Del Monte Dunes as dictum. See Fallon E-mail, supra note 37. I am not entirely
convinced of this characterization. In my view, the passage may be more accurately characterized as
an expression of doubt made in the course of describing the rationale for the plurality's conclusion.
Cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) ("When an opinion issues for the Court, it is
not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are
bound."). Although the plurality's expression of doubt about sovereign immunity's vitality in the
face of the Fourteenth Amendment is fairly offhand, it seems significant that the remark is made in
response to a remark from Justices who are usually hostile to sovereign immunity. This
circumstance, in my view, prevents treating that expression of doubt as utterly casual.
52. Besides the suggestion of the plurality in Del Monte Dunes, the only other decision of the
Court suggesting a position on the issue is Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979). That case involved a private action against an interstate compact in
which the plaintiffs alleged, among other things, a taking of their property without just
compensation. Id. at 394. The question before the Court was whether the interstate compact was
"entitled to the immunity that the Eleventh Amendment provides to the compacting States
themselves." Id. at 393. It might be inferred from the Court's decision that, if the compact did have
sovereign immunity, the just-compensation claim would be barred by that immunity. That inference,
of course, is contrary to the plurality's suggestion in Del Monte that the Fourteenth Amendment
overrides sovereign immunity. Lake Country is no more than suggestive, however, because the Court
held that the compact did not have sovereign immunity from the just-compensation claim asserted
there. See id. at 400-02.
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Parts III and IV.
II. ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE IS OPEN, THE COURT'S CASE LAW
VIRTUALLY COMPELS THE CONCLUSION THAT
UNCONSENTING STATES ARE IMMUNE FROM JUST-
COMPENSATION SUITS BROUGHT IN FEDERAL COURT
As shown in Part I, the Court has never squarely decided whether
States are immune from private actions for just compensation. As
explained in this Part and as the lower federal courts have held, however,
the Court's decisions virtually compel the conclusion that States are
immune from just-compensation actions when those actions are filed in
federal court.
53
Admittedly, the Court's decisions stop short of producing an airtight
conclusion, precisely because none involves a suit for just compensation
directly against the State. As discussed below in Section A, the absence
of such cases reflects that it took some time for the Court to decide that
the Just Compensation Clause even applied to the States (via the
Fourteenth Amendment). By the time the Court did so, the Court had
also decided that neither a State nor its officials can be sued in federal
court by a private plaintiff seeking money from the state treasury, even
for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although none of these decisions involved a federal-court action
brought directly against a State for just compensation, the inescapable
implication of those decisions is that such actions are barred by
sovereign immunity. As discussed below in Section B, the Court has
uniformly held that federal courts cannot entertain suits directly against a
State or suits against state officers that seek money from the state
treasury. None of these holdings suggest any exception for suits seeking
just compensation.
53. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996, 1005 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that sovereign immunity barred takings claim asserted against state entity and state
officers in federal-court action), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found.,
524 U.S. 156 (1998); McMurtray v. Holladay, 11 F.3d 499, 504-05 (5th Cir. 1993) (same);
Broughton Lumber Co. v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n, 975 F.2d 616, 618-20 (9th Cir 1992)
(holding that sovereign immunity barred inverse-condemnation action in federal court against two
states and commission formed to administer interstate compact); Garrett v. Illinois, 612 F.2d 1038,
1039-40 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that sovereign immunity barred just-compensation claim brought
against state in federal court).
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A. The Court Has Never Squarely Addressed Whether Federal Courts
Can Hear Suits for Just Compensation from the States
The Court has not had much chance to decide whether States are
immune from private suits for just compensation. In 1833, the Court held
that the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not apply
of its own force to the States; instead, the Clause applied only to the
federal government.54 In 1877, the Court rejected the argument that the
Just Compensation Clause applied to the States by virtue of its
incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It was only in 1897 that the Court reversed its position on
incorporation.56 In 1897, the Court held that the Just Compensation
Clause was incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 7 Before 1897, though, a suit against a State alleging a
violation of the Just Compensation Clause failed to state a cause of
action and was thus defective quite apart from any immunity problem."
By the time that the Court decided in 1897 that the Just Compensation
Clause applies to the States, the Court had developed an "officer suit"
doctrine that enabled takings claimants to get remedies against individual
54. See Barron v. The Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247-51 (1833).
55. See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877) ("If private property be taken for public
uses without just compensation, it must be remembered that, when the fourteenth amendment was
adopted, the provision on that subject, in immediate juxtaposition in the fifth amendment, with the
one we are construing, was left out.").
56. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
57. Id. at 241 ("[A] judgment of a state court... whereby private property is taken for the State or
under its direction for public use, without compensation made or secured to the owner,
is... wanting in the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment .... "). The Court in
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad did not expressly rely on an incorporation theory. See
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 & n.5, 405-07 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad is better understood as resting on doctrine of
substantive due process); see also RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND
BILL OF RIGHTS 24-29, 215 (1981) (noting that case did not rest on incorporation theory).
Nonetheless, the Court has consistently understood its decision in that case as resting on an
incorporation theory. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 n.5; see also, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121
S. Ct. 2448, 2457 (2001).
58. See Davidson, 96 U.S. at 105 (stating that State's taking of private property for public use
would not violate Due Process Clause); Barron, 32 U.S. at 251 (holding that Court lacked
jurisdiction to review state-court decision rejecting taking claim against city because claim did not
state a violation of Fifth Amendment). But cf. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial
Federalism and the Administrative States, 87 CAL. L REv. 613, 626-32 (1999) (discussing early
cases in which Court applied "general constitutional principles" in diversity cases involving power
of state and local governments to take and condemn property).
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officers and thereby avoid sovereign immunity. 9 A famous case
illustrating the officer-suit doctrine is United States v. Lee,6" which was
decided in 1882 in favor of the descendants of Robert E. Lee. In Lee, the
Court upheld the eviction of federal officers from Arlington Cemetery
because the land used for the cemetery had been taken from Lee without
just compensation.6 In 1897, the Court relied on Lee to award similar
injunctive relief against state officers who had occupied the plaintiffs
62 abuland without paying just compensation. At about the same time, the
Court upheld an award of personal damages against an official who had
caused an uncompensated taking. 63 Thus, by 1897, a property owner
whose property had been taken by a State without just compensation
could sue the responsible state officials for an injunction preventing their
continued "taking" of the property and for damages out of their own
pockets. 6 Because such an "officer suit" was not considered to be a suit
against the sovereign, it was not barred by sovereign immunity.
Given the remedies available in an officer suit, a takings claimant
would have been crazy to sue a State directly for just compensation in
federal court. By 1897, the Court had repeatedly stated that a person
could not sue a State directly (as distinguished from suing its officers)
without the State's consent.65 The Court had so held even for claims
59. See generally Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate Treatment of
Contract Claims Against the Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43 VILL. L. REv. 155,
160-68 (1998) [hereinafter Seamon, Separation of Powers] (discussing officer suits).
60. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
61, Id. at 223.
62. See Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 212-23 (1897) (relying primarily on Lee to hold that
sovereign immunity did not bar ejectment action against state officers who took plaintiffs land
without just compensation).
63. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 21-23 (1896); cf Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. Coll., 221 U.S.
636, 647-48 (1911) (upholding award of damages against public college that was considered to be
analogous to an individual official).
64. See supra notes 60-63 (citing cases); see also Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 151-53
(1900) (holding that sovereign immunity did not bar ejectment claim against federal officer in which
claimant alleged a taking without just compensation).
65. See. e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644 (1892) (stating that "the judicial power of
the United States does not extend to suits of individuals against States"); Cunningham v. Macon &
Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883) ("It may be accepted as a point of departure
unquestioned, that neither a State nor the United States can be sued as defendant in any court in this
country without their consent .... ); Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337, 339 (1879) ("The
principle is elementary that a State cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent."); Beers v.
Arkansas, 61 U S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857) ("It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all
civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its
consent and permission .... "); cf Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304 (1853) (holding that
individuals could sue State for money in its own courts with State's consent).
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alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the 1890 case of
North Carolina v. Temple,66 for example, the Court held that sovereign
immunity barred a federal-court action against a State alleging that the
State had violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to make
payments on state bonds.67 Moreover, Temple was only one of many
cases in which sovereign immunity defeated constitutional claims against
States that had reneged on their bond obligations.68 This case law,
combined with the availability of relief against state officers, goes far to
explain why the Court never had a case that required it squarely to decide
whether the Just Compensation Clause overrode the States' sovereign
inmunity.
69
Nonetheless, the officer suit had a major shortcoming. You could sue
an officer for damages out of the officer's own pocket and for an
injunction preventing the officer from violating federal law. You could
not sue an officer, however, to get money from the state treasury.70 That
was one type of relief as to which the Court would not indulge the fiction
that the suit was against the officer, rather than against the State. As the
Court said,
No suit.., can be maintained against a public officer which
seeks to compel him to exercise the State's power of taxation; or
to pay out its money in his possession on the State's obligations,
66. 134 U.S. 22 (1890)
67. Id. at 25, 30 (holding that Eleventh Amendment barred federal-court action against State
alleging violations of Contract Clause and Fourteenth Amendment).
68. See, e-g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890) (holding that sovereign immunity barred
federal-court action by a citizen against his own State alleging that State's failure to pay interest on
its bonds violated Contract Clause of U.S. Constitution). Many of these suits rested on the
Impairment of Contracts Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See, e.g., Hans, 134 U.S. at 13. The
suits were uniformly rejected to the extent that the relief sought would "expend itself on the public
treasury." Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947); see also Seamon, Separation of Powers, supra
note 59, at 168-74.
69. In addition, it appears that just compensation became increasingly available in the state courts
during the 19th century. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 149-51 (1998) (discussing nineteenth-century case law recognizing right to just
compensation as natural right); Brauneis, supra note 20, at 85 n.1 14 (discussing gradual adoption of
state constitutional provisions guaranteeing just compensation); J.A.C. Grant, The "Higher Law"
Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 WIS. L. REV. 67,70-71 (1931) (discussing evolution
of just-compensation concept in United States as judicial development based on theory of natural
rights).
70. See, eg., Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 727-28 (1883). The Court in Jumel and other
cases after the Civil War repudiated its earlier "party of record" rule, under which sovereign
immunity never barred suits against government officers. See generally Seamon, Separation of
Powers, supra note 59, at 162-63, 169-73 (discussing party-of-record rule).
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or to execute a contract, or to do any affirmative act which
affects the State's political or property rights.7'
Officer suits for that sort of relief were deemed to be "really" suits
against the sovereign itself.
72
This limitation on officer suits clearly would have prevented someone
from getting an injunction requiring an officer to pay just compensation
from the state treasury. Perhaps because this was so clear, there appear to
be no reported decisions by the United States Supreme Court in which a
plaintiff sought that sort of relief.
B. The Court's Sovereign Immunity Decisions Strongly Suggest that
Federal Courts Cannot Hear Suits for Just Compensation from the
States
Although none of the Court's cases involved federal-court suits
seeking just compensation from the government treasury, there are cases
in which plaintiffs alleging violations of the Just Compensation Clause
sought remedies different from those traditionally available in officer
suits (i.e., damages out of the officer's pocket and injunctions prohibiting
the officer from continuing to take the plaintiffs property). The Court's
rejection of nontraditional remedies in these cases demonstrates that
sovereign immunity would have barred the use of an officer suit to get
just compensation from a State.
One such case, Belknap v. Schild,73 involved a patent-infringement
claim against federal officers. The plaintiff held a patent for an
improvement to caisson gates.74 He sued the officers who had been using
a supposedly infringing caisson gate at a federal navy yard.75 The Court
71. Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. Coll., 221 U.S. 636, 642 (1911) (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., Int'l Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U.S. 601, 605 (1904) (patent-infringement
action to enjoin official's use of infringing government property "really was against the United
States"); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Ind. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) ("And when
the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial
party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual
officials are nominal defendants.").
73. 161 U.S. 10 (1896).
74. Id. at 11. A caisson is a watertight chamber used for underwater construction and repair of,
e.g., ships. See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 160 (10th ed. 1993) ("caisson,"
definition 2(a)).
75. See Belknap, 161 U.S. at 23 (observing that, according to government's pleading, the
allegedly infringing caisson gate "was made and used by the United States in a dry dock at a navy
yard, and the defendants only operated and used it as officers, servants, and employe's [sic] of the
United States").
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recognized that the officers' conduct violated the Just Compensation
Clause, remarking that "the United States have no more right than any
private person to use a patented invention without license of the patentee
or making compensation to him., 76 Because of that violation, the Court
held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages from the officers' own
pockets." The Court also held, however, that the plaintiff was not
entitled to an injunction preventing federal officers from continuing to
use the navy-yard caisson gate that allegedly infringed his patent.78 That
injunctive relief was barred, the Court explained, because it sought to
control government-owned property.79 The Court's explanation made it
clear that sovereign immunity would likewise bar an injunction tapping
the government treasury: "[N]o injunction can be issued against officers
of a State, to restrain or control the use of property already in the
possession of the State, or money in its treasury when the suit is
commenced."8 This reference to the inaccessibility of "money in [the]
treasury" shows that, just as the plaintiff in Belknap could not enjoin use
of the infringing caisson gate, he could not have gotten compensation
from the U.S. Treasury.8
The Court reached a similar conclusion in a case involving a State. In
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College,82 the plaintiff claimed that a
state college had taken his land without just compensation by building a
dike that caused his land to flood." The Court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to an award of damages that could be executed against property
that the College owned in its own right, separate and apart from the
State.84 The Court appeared to assume, however, that the award of
damages could not be executed against state-owned property or funds.8
76. Id. at 16.
77. Id. at 23 (holding that defendant officials could be "held liable to the patentee for their own
infringement of his patent"); see also id. at 18 ("[O]fficers or agents, although acting under order of
the United States, are ... personally liable to be sued for their own infringement of a patent.").
78. Id. at 23 (holding that lower court "erred in awarding an injunction against the defendants").
79. Id. at 18-25.
80. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
81. Id.; see also Int'l Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U.S. 601, 605 (1904) (relying on Belknap to
reject claim for injunctive relief in patent-infringement case against federal government).
82. 221 U.S. 636 (1911).
83. Id. at 638-40.
84. Id. at 648.
85. See id. (observing, in response to defendant's argument that State held title to land underlying
the college, that money judgment could be satisfied out of land that college itself owned in fee
simple and out of its various sources of income).
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Moreover, the Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an
injunction requiring the College to destroy the dike.86 That relief was not
warranted because the title to the dike, as well as the title to the land on
which the dike was located, might be held by the State, not the College:
The state, therefore, may be a necessary party to any proceeding
which seeks to affect the land itself, or to remove any structure
thereon which has become a part of the land. If so, and unless it
consents to be sued, the court cannot decree the removal of the
embankment which forms a part of the State's property.87
The Court in Hopkins, as in Belknap, said that a court could not compel
an officer to "pay out [the State's] money ... or to do any affirmative act
which affects the State's political or property rights.88 Thus, the decision
in Hopkins, like that in Belknap, makes clear that sovereign immunity
would have barred an award of just compensation from the sovereign's
treasury.
C. The Bottom Line: Hints but No Holdings that Permit Federal
Courts To Require States To Pay Just Compensation
Belknap and Hopkins date from about the turn of the century but are
still good law. Throughout the twentieth century, the Court has held that
sovereign immunity bars federal suits seeking money from the state
treasury, including for violations of federal law. 89 Except for footnote 9
of First English, a majority of the Court has never suggested that an
unconsenting State can be sued for just compensation in federal court.
Nonetheless, a plurality of the Court in Del Monte Dunes doubted
whether "the sovereign immunity rationale retains its vitality in cases
where th[e] [Fourteenth] Amendment is applicable."9 This could be read
as a hint that the sovereign-immunity principle does not apply when a
86. Id. at 648-49.
87. Id. at 649.
88. Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
89. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,665-78 (1974) (holding that relief in federal-court
officer suit that would require payment of retroactive monetary relief from state treasury was barred
by sovereign immunity); Ford Motor Co. v. Ind. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 462-70 (1945)
(holding that sovereign immunity barred federal-court action against state agency and officials for
refund of taxes allegedly collected in violation of Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment);
see also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (stating that suit is considered to be one against
the sovereign if the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury).
90. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 714 (1999) (plurality
opinion) (citing, with a "cf" signal, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 US. 304, 316 n.9 (1987), discussed at text accompanying notes 19-42, supra).
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claim is based on the Just Compensation Clause or some other provision
made applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment. To carry
through on this hint while remaining faithful to the precedent discussed
in this Part, the Court would need to conclude that a private action for
just compensation against an unconsenting State has to be brought
somewhere other than in a federal court, such as in the State's own
courts. That is precisely the result for which this Article contends.9' To
reach that result, however, the Court would also have to grapple with
case law discussed in the next Part, which suggests that the States'
immunity in their own courts is symmetrical to their immunity in federal
court and to the immunity of the federal government.
I. SYMMETRY SUGGESTS THAT STATES ARE ALSO
IMMUNE FROM JUST-COMPENSATION SUITS BROUGHT
IN THEIR OWN COURTS
The thesis of this Article is that unconsenting States can sometimes be
sued in their own courts for just compensation.92 Nonetheless, there is
Supreme Court case law supporting a contrary conclusion, and that case
law is discussed in this Part. The case law includes a case discussed
above in Part II, Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College.93 Hopkins
could be read as directly supporting state sovereign immunity from just-
compensation claims in state courts. 4 Other case law supplies indirect
support by establishing two dimensions of symmetry in the law of
sovereign immunity. The first symmetry is between the States' sovereign
immunity in federal court and the States' sovereign immunity in their
own courts.95 The second symmetry is between the sovereign immunity
of the States and the sovereign immunity of the federal government.96
These two dimensions of symmetry are not only deeply rooted in the
Court's precedent; they were reaffirmed by the Court in Alden v.
Maine.97 Nonetheless, the case law discussed in this Part does not
foreclose this Article's thesis that the Fourteenth Amendment sometimes
overrides the States' sovereign immunity from just-compensation claims.
91. See infra notes 178-248 and accompanying text (Part IV).
92. See infra notes 178-248 and accompanying text (Part IV).
93. 221 U.S. 636 (1911).
94. See infra notes 98-11 and accompanying text (Part IM.A).
95. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (Part llI.B).
96. See infra notes 115-39 and accompanying text (Part II.C).
97. 527 U.S. 706 (1999), discussed infra notes 140-77 and accompanying text (Part I.D).
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A. Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College
Hopkins was discussed above in Part II to show that States have
sovereign immunity in federal courts even from claims based on the Just
Compensation Clause (as incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment). 98 Now this Article discusses Hopkins' suggestion that this
immunity from just-compensation claims extends even to a State's own
courts.
Dr. Hopkins filed his lawsuit against the Clemson Agricultural College
in a South Carolina state court, alleging that a dike built by the College
had taken his property (by flooding it) without just compensation.99 The
case came to the U.S. Supreme Court after the South Carolina Supreme
Court relied on sovereign immunity to affirm the dismissal of Hopkins'
lawsuit. 100 The U.S. Supreme Court held that Hopkins was entitled to
recover damages payable out of the College's own property.'' The
Court appeared to agree with the College, however, that an award of
damages could not be executed against state funds or state-owned
property.'0 2 In addition, the Court held that Hopkins was not entitled to
an injunction requiring the College to tear down the dike that had caused
Hopkins' land to flood, because that dike sat on state-owned land.0 3 The
decision in Hopkins thus strongly suggests that, when a state agent takes
private property for public use without just compensation, the State has
sovereign immunity in its own courts from relief that would be paid out
of the state treasury or that would affect state-owned property.'0 4
Indeed, the only reason that Dr. Hopkins was able to get damages from
the College was because the Court concluded that the College did not
98. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (discussing Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. Coll.,
221 U.S 636(1911)).
99. Hopkins, 221 U.S. at 637-41.
100. Id at 636.
101. Id. at 644-48.
102. See id. at 648 (observing that, even if the land on which college was located was "not subject
to levy and sale" because the State held title to it, the college itself held some land in fee simple and
had various sources of income to satisfy the money judgment against it).
103. Id. at 648-49; see also text'accompanying note 87, supra (quoting relevant passage of
Court's opinion).
104. See generally Richard H. Seamon, The Sovereign Immunity of States in Their Own Courts,
37 BRANDEIS L.J. 319, 347-48, 381, 383 (Spring 1998) [hereinafter Seamon, Sovereign Immunity]
(explaining that Hopkins supports recognition that Constitution protects States' immunity from
private actions for retroactive monetary relief in their own courts).
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share the State's immunity.' 5 The Court treated the College the same as
an individual officer or a unit of local government, neither of which, the
Court had previously held, possessed sovereign immunity from personal
damages for tortious conduct.'0 6 Dr. Hopkins might not have been so
lucky today. In recent years, the lower federal courts have consistently
held that state universities are "arms of the State" that share the State's
sovereign immunity.' 7
I believe that Hopkins can be read narrowly, for reasons that I will
now explain, and that it should be read narrowly, for reasons discussed in
Part IV."8 Hopkins can be read as a case in which the State had
immunity in its own courts only because that immunity did not prevent
the plaintiff from getting adequate relief in those courts for the taking of
his property. Under the Court's decision, Dr. Hopkins could recover
damages from the College, in periodic state-court suits, as long as the
dike continued to take his land, because the College did not share the
State's sovereign immunity." 9 Furthermore, the Court suggested that Dr.
Hopkins would not be forced to bring periodic suits against the College
indefinitely. Rather, the forces of nature would take care of the problem.
The dike that had caused the flooding of Hopkins' land had already
washed away once, and the Court observed that Hopkins might be able to
have the College enjoined from "further acts looking to the maintenance
or reconstruction of the d[i]ke."" 0 Such injunctive relief against a future
taking, coupled with compensation from the College for the prior taking,
arguably provided adequate relief in state court."' For these reasons,
Hopkins can be read as a case in which sovereign immunity did not
prevent an adequate state remedy for a governmental taking of property.
105. See Hopkins, 221 U.S. at 642-46 (framing the question as "whether a public corporation can
avail itself of the State's immunity from suit" and holding that, although college was an agent of the
State, it did not share State's immunity in action alleging unconstitutional and tortious conduct).
106. See id. at 643-44 (relying on suits against public officials to reject College's claim that it had
sovereign immunity); id. at 645 (citing Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890)
(holding that County did not share State's sovereign immunity)).
107. See Richard H. Seamon, Damages for Unconstitutional Affirmative Action: An Analysis of
the Monetary Claims in Hopwood v. Texas, 71 TEMPLE L REv. 839, 859-61 (1998) (discussing
cases holding that state colleges and universities were entitled to sovereign immunity).
108. See infra notes 178-248 and accompanying text (Part IV).
109. See Hopkins, 221 U.S. at 639-40, 648.
110. Id. at 649.
111. Cf. Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 591 n.6 (1995)
(stating in dicta that, despite general rule that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not authorize declaratory or
injunctive relief against illegal state taxes if state law provides adequate remedy, declaratory relief
might be available ifnecessary to spare taxpayer from having to bring multiple suits).
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So read, Hopkins would not support a State's use of sovereign immunity
to bar an adequate remedy for a taking.
B. Symmetry Between the States 'Immunity in Federal Court and Their
Immunity in Their Own Courts
As discussed in Part II, Supreme Court case law virtually compels the
conclusion that States cannot be sued for just compensation in federal
court. (They cannot be sued directly, nor can their officers be sued for an
injunction requiring the payment of just compensation from the state
treasury." '2) Other case law indicates that the State's immunity in federal
court is symmetrical to their immunity in their own courts." 3 Together,
these two lines of cases forcefully suggest that unconsenting States
cannot be sued for just compensation in their own courts.
The case law indicating that the State's federal-court immunity and
their state-court immunity are symmetrical dates back to the early 19th
century. The Court has consistently relied on the States' immunity in
federal court to determine the scope of their immunity in their own
courts, and vice-versa. As discussed below in Section D, the Court did so
again in its recent decision in Alden v. Maine."4
C. Symmetry Between the Sovereign Immunity of States and the
Sovereign Immunity of the United States
The Court has not only treated the States' immunity in federal court as
being symmetrical to the States' immunity in their own courts. In
addition, the Court has often treated the States' sovereign immunity as
symmetrical to the United States' sovereign immunity."' Because of this
112. See supra notes 53-91 and accompanying text (Part 11).
113. I have discussed this case law in an earlier Article and will not repeat the discussion here.
For a discussion of earlier case law, see Seamon, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 104, at 375-88.
114. 527 U.S. 706, 745-46 (1999), discussed infra notes 140-177 and accompanying text.
115. See. e.g., Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 686 n.21 (1982)
(Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (citing with apparent approval
precedent treating state sovereign immunity similarly to federal sovereign immunity); Great N. Life
Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944) ("The principle of immunity from litigation assures the
states and the nation from unanticipated intervention in the processes of government."); Philadelphia
Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620 (1912) (stating that principle permitting state officers to be sued
for injunctive relief against violation of federal law is "equally applicable" to federal officers);
Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 213 (1897) (stating that, in analyzing whether suit against state
officer was barred by sovereign immunity, "the question whether a particular suit is one against the
State, within the meaning of the Constitution, must depend upon the same principles that determine
whether a particular suit is one against the United States"); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick
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apparent symmetry between state and federal sovereign immunity, an
analysis of whether the States are immune from just-compensation
claims must consider the United States' immunity from such claims.
The Court's early case law suggests that the United States is immune
from just-compensation claims except to the extent that it has waived
that immunity in legislation such as the Tucker Act."6 As Professor
Brauneis has noted, the "classic cases" supporting that suggestion are
Schillinger v. United States"7 and Lynch v. United States."' Professor
Brauneis adds that those cases are "somewhat dated.".. 9 Indeed, in light
of later decisions of the Court, Schillinger and Lynch do not foreclose
this Article's thesis that the Due Process Clause sometimes overrides
sovereign immunity. 2 °
In Schillinger, the Court held that the plaintiff could not sue the United
States under the Tucker Act for infringing on the plaintiffs patented
method of laying concrete pavement.'' The plaintiff alleged that, by
infringing on his patent, the government had taken his property for public
use without just compensation." The Court determined that this
infringement claim did not fall into any of the categories of claims as to
which the Tucker Act waived the federal government's sovereign
immunity; it was therefore barred by sovereign immunity." That
t.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883) ("It may be accepted as a point of departure unquestioned, that
neither a State nor the United States can be sued as defendant in any court in this country without
their consent, except in the limited class of cases in which a State may be made a party in the
Supreme Court of the United States by virtue of the original jurisdiction conferred on this court by
the Constitution."); see also Seamon, Separation of Powers, supra note 59, at 173-74 (citing and
discussing cases in which "the Court did not distinguish the sovereign immunity of the states from
that of the United States"). But cf., eg., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419, 478 (1793)
(opinion of Jay, C.J.) (stating that federal courts' reliance on executive branch for enforcement of its
judgments "place[s] the case of a state, and the case of the United States, in very different points of
view" when it comes to sovereign immunity).
116. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (1998).
117. 155 U.S. 163 (1894).
118. 292 U.S. 571 (1934); see also Brauneis, supra note 20, at 138 n.343 (citing Lynch, 292 U.S.
at 579-82, and Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 168). But cf. Kenneth N. Klee et al., State Defiance of
Bankruptcy Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1576-77 (1999) (asserting that "[c]ourts have held that
the United States may not assert its sovereign immunity as a defense to a Takings Clause claim");
Michael P. Kenny, Sovereign Immunity and the Rule ofLaw: Aspiring to a Highest-Ranked View of
the Eleventh Amendment, 1 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 1, 14 (1992) (similar assertion).
119. Brauneis, supra note 20, at 138 n.343.
120. See infra notes 126-127, 134, 138 and accompanying text.
121. Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 166-72.
122. See id. at 168.
123. Id. at 167-72.
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determination rested primarily on the Court's view that the alleged
violation of the Just Compensation Clause did not, in and of itself, state a
"claim[] founded upon the constitution" within the meaning of the
Tucker Act. 24  At this time, the Court did not construe the Just
Compensation Clause as creating a cause of action except when the
circumstances of the taking implied a promise by the government to pay
just compensation.1 5 The Court in later cases concluded that the Clause
itself creates a cause of action, without regard to whether the government
impliedly promised to pay for the property that it had taken. 26 Thus, the
predicate for the Court's sovereign-immunity ruling in Schillinger is no
longer valid. 2  Even so, the portion of Schillinger that has been
superceded by later case law concerned the existence of a cause of
action, not the existence of sovereign immunity. Because these are two
124. Id. at 167 (observing that, under then-recent amendment, Court of Claims could hear "[ajll
claims founded upon the constitution"); id. at 168 (rejecting plaintiffs argument that official's
tortious appropriation of private property for public use "creates a claim founded upon the
constitution").
125. See ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE 40 n.20 (1999) (noting that "[e]arly
decisions hung the [Court of Claims'] jurisdiction on the 'implied contract with the United States'
phrase in the Tucker Act," but later cases "shifted to the statute's 'claim ... founded.. . under the
Constitution' phrase"); Brauneis, supra note 20, at 137 n.342 (discussing Court's transition from the
view that Court of Claims' jurisdiction over just-compensation claim rested on "implied contract" to
modem view that such claims arise directly under the Constitution); Developments in the Law:
Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARv. L. REV. 827, 876 (1957) ("Before
1927 the Supreme Court... took the view that a 'taking' action could be maintained [under the
Tucker Act] only ifa promise to make compensation could be attributed to the Government.").
126. See e.g., Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) ("If there is a
taking, the claim is 'founded upon the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the [Claims Court
to hear and determine.") (adding bracketed text and quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,
267 (1946)). In United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947), the Court said:
But whether the theory of these suits be that there was a taking under the Fifth Amendment, and
that therefore the Tucker Act may be invoked because it is a claim founded upon the
Constitution, or that there was an implied promise by the Government to pay for it, is
immaterial. In either event, the claim traces back to the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment ....
See also Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933) (holding that lower court erred in
considering just-compensation claim to be based on implied contract, and stating: "A promise to pay
was not necessary .... The suits were thus founded upon the Constitution."); Seaboard Air Line Ry.
v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923) (stating that property owner's right to recover just
compensation from United States "does not depend on contract" and that "[a] promise to pay is not
necessary"); see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 315 (1987) (observing that "it has been established at least since Jacobs ... that claims forjust
compensation are grounded in the Constitution itself").
127. See Developments in the Law, supra note 125, at 876 (commenting that Court decisions
rejecting takings claims that could not be supported on implied-contract rationale seemed to rest on
Court's assumption that Just Compensation Clause itself did not create cause of action).
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distinct issues (as discussed above), 28 Schillinger still constitutes
precedent suggesting that the federal government would be immune from
just-compensation suits in the absence of its consent." •
In Lynch, the Court held that a federal statute violated substantive due
process by repudiating the government's obligation to honor contracts of
war insurance. 3' The statute was a wartime, cost-saving measure; it
purported to repeal earlier statutes that gave low-cost death and disability
insurance to people who fought in World War I. The Court
determined that the repeal of those statutes would breach the
government's contracts with the insured veterans and thereby
unconstitutionally deprive them of a property right. 32  In addition to
holding the repealer statute unconstitutional, the Court held that the
statute did not withdraw the federal government's consent to suits to
recover money under the insurance contracts that the statute sought to
repeal.' In other words, the Court construed the statute to prevent the
United States from using sovereign immunity to defeat a constitutional
challenge to its contract repudiation. This result, if anything, implies that
the federal government cannot use its sovereign immunity to prevent an
adequate remedy for its unlawful deprivation of property, including its
128. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
129. Other cases, like Schillinger, suggest that the United States is immune from just-
compensation claims based on a rationale the continued validity of which is dubious. See, e.g.,
United States v. N. Am. Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1920); Tempel v. United
States, 248 U.S. 121, 130-31 (1918); Russell v. United States, 182 U.S. 516, 535 (1901); see also
United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 414 (1980) (arguably suggesting that Congress must
"waive[] the Government's sovereign immunity" for "courts to resolve a taking claim on the
merits").
130. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934) (holding that "Congress was without
power to reduce expenditures by abrogating contractual obligations of the United States" that arose
under wartime insurance policies issued by the government).
13 1. See id. at 574-79 (describing statutes that created wartime insurance program).
132. Id. at 576 (holding that insurance policies "are contracts of the United States"); id. at 579
(observing that repeal of statutes creating those policies would, "if valid, abrogat[e]" those contracts
and "relieve[] the United States from all liability on the contracts without making compensation to
the beneficiaries"); id. (holding that insurance contracts were protected by Just Compensation
Clause; that, in absence of power to annul them, "the due process clause prohibits the United States
from annulling them"; and that no such power had been identified).
133. See id. at 575 (government argued that lower courts lacked jurisdiction over the suit
"because the consent of the United States to be sued had been withdrawn" by same statute that
purported to repeal prior statutes creating wartime insurance); id. at 586 (rejecting government's
argument, stating: "[I]t does not appear that Congress wished to deny the [judicial] remedy if the
repeal of the contractual right was held void under the Fifth Amendment.").
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takings of private property for public use without just compensation. 134
The Lynch Court did say in dicta that Congress could have withdrawn
consent to suit on the insurance contracts as long as it did not repudiate
its obligation to honor the contracts. 35 In light of the holding in Lynch,
this dicta should be read to mean only that the government could fulfill
its contractual obligations "without the interposition of' the courts. 36 It
should not be read to mean that the United States need not provide a way
of honoring those obligations or its obligation to pay just compensation
when it takes private property for public use. 137 As the Court recently
said, the government can violate the Constitution "either by denying just
compensation in fact or by refusing to provide procedures through which
compensation may be sought."'3 8 In light of that principle, the Lynch
dicta suggests only that the Constitution does not require that
compensation procedures take the form of judicial procedures.'39
134. See Reg'l Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 134-36 (1974) (citing Lynch to support
interpreting a federal statute not to preclude suit for just compensation under Tucker Act); Battaglia
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (citing Lynch, among other cases, for
proposition that, "while Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the
jurisdiction of [federal] courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power as to
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to take private property
without just compensation") (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948).
135. See Lynch, 292 U.S. at 581 ("Although consent to sue was thus given when the [war
insurance] policy issued, Congress retained power to withdraw the consent at any time.").
136. Id. at 582 ("So long as the contractual obligation is recognized, Congress may direct its
fulfillment without the interposition of either a court or an administrative tribunal."); cf Beers v.
Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 528-30 (1857) (rejecting constitutional challenge to state statute
creating additional requirements for suing State in state court on its bond obligations and suggesting
that even repeal of state statute permitting such suits would not imply that State repudiated the
contract obligations upon which such suits were based).
137. Such a reading of the Lynch dicta would be at odds with not only the holding in Lynch but
also the Court's later decision in DeLa Rama Steam Ship Co. v. United States, 344 U.S. 386 (1953).
In De La Rama, the Court refused to construe a federal statute to take away a federal district court's
jurisdiction to hear a claim against the United States based on a government insurance policy. De La
Rama 344 U.S. at 387-91. The Court cited Lynch and observed that the effect of such a construction
would be to prevent the plaintiff from enforcing the government's contractual obligations. Id. at 382,
388-90; see also Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 431 (1931) (stating in dicta that Congress could
not withdraw consent to suits against itself, and preclude suits against its officers, to prevent paying
tax refunds, if it lacked power to enact legislation eliminating the right to the refunds).
138. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 717 (1999).
139. See infra notes 182-195 and accompanying text (arguing that States may be able to use
nonjudicial procedures to meet their obligation under Due Process Clause to provide procedure for
payment ofjust compensation).
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D. Alden v. Maine
The two dimensions of symmetry that have been discussed-(1)
between the States' immunity in federal court and their immunity in their
own courts; and (2) between the States' immunity and that of the United
States-underlay Alden v. Maine.40  Alden therefore reinforces an
argument that (1) if States are immune from just-compensation claims in
federal court and (2) if the United States would be immune from just-
compensation claims in the absence of the Tucker Act, then States should
be immune from just-compensation claims in their own courts. 4 ' Like
the other case law discussed in this Part of the Article, Alden does not
compel the conclusion that States are invariably immune from just-
compensation suits brought in their own courts.
In Alden, the Court addressed an issue that arose in the wake of the
Court's decision three years earlier in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.' In
Seminole Tribe, the Court held that Congress cannot use its Article I
powers to authorize private actions for retroactive monetary relief to be
brought against unconsenting States in federal court." 3 This naturally
led to the question whether Congress could use Article I to subject
unconsenting States to such suits in their own courts.'" Addressing this
question so soon after Seminole Tribe, the Court seems to have regarded
140. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I wrote an amicus brief in
Alden on behalf of a group of state and local organizations. See Brief of the National Conference of
State Legislatures [et al.], Alden v. Maine (No. 98-436). The Court adopted one of the arguments in
that amicus brief. Compare id. at 15 (arguing that Court's anti-commandeering precedent prevents
Congress from "using the Commerce Clause... to tum the State against itself' by "pitting the
executive branch of Maine against its judicial branch") with Alden, 527 U.S. at 749 ("A power to
press a State's own courts into federal service to coerce the other branches of the State... is the
power first to turn the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire political
machinery of the State against its will .... ).
141. For reasons discussed above, decisions of the United States Supreme Court virtually compel
the conclusion that unconsenting States are immune from just-compensation claims in federal court.
See supra notes 53-91 and accompanying text (Part II). In contrast, it is unclear from the Court's
case law whether the United States would be immune from just-compensation claims in federal court
in the absence of the waiver of immunity in the Tucker Act. See supra notes 116-39 and
accompanying text (arguing that older Court decisions suggesting that federal government is
immune from just-compensation claims do not resolve the issue); see also infra notes 329-43 and
accompanying text (arguing that, in the absence of Tucker Act, Due Process Clause of Fifth
Amendment would require United States to provide adequate procedures for paying just
compensation).
142. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
143. Id. at 72-73.
144. Alden, 527 U.S. at 741 ("Whether Congress has authority under Article I to abrogate a
State's immunity from suit in its own courts is... a question of first impression.").
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it as a question of symmetry: for private causes of action authorized by
federal statutes enacted under Article I, is a State's immunity in its own
courts symmetrical to its immunity in federal court? 4 5 That the issue
was one of symmetry was reinforced by the facts of Alden. The plaintiffs
in that case initially sued the State of Maine in federal court to recover
overtime wages under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. 146 After that
federal-court suit was dismissed based on Seminole Tribe, the plaintiffs
brought an identical suit against Maine in Maine's own courts. 47 The
Court held in Alden that this state-court action was likewise barred by
sovereign immunity.141
The majority opinion in Alden consisted of four parts. Part I
demonstrated that the States' sovereign immunity derives, not from the
Eleventh Amendment, but from the original Constitution. 49  Part II
demonstrated that Congress could not override this immunity using its
Article I powers. 50 Part III discussed limits on the States' immunity,
including the States' ability to waive their immunity.' 5' Part IV rejected
the plaintiffs' argument that Maine had waived its immunity from the
claims in that case. 52 In discussing the nature of the States' immunity in
their own courts (in Part I) and Congress's power to abrogate that
immunity (in Part II), the Court repeatedly linked the States' immunity in
federal court to their immunity in their own courts and also linked the
States' immunity to that of the federal government.
Specifically, the Court determined in Part I that the original
145. See Jackson, Seductions, supra note 19, at 698 (asserting that, "[hlaving decided ... in
Seminole Tribe that the Eleventh Amendment barred the states from being sued in federal courts
without their consent on Article I causes of action, coherence arguments for the same rule in state
courts apparently were very attractive to the Court [in Alden]").
146. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1998) (codifying Fair Labor Standards Act); Mills v. Maine, 118
F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1997) (upholding dismissal of federal-court action involving same claims as
addressed in Alden).
147. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
148. Id. at 712, 754.
149. Id. at 713 (concluding that state sovereign immunity "neither derives from, nor is limited by,
the terms of the Eleventh Amendment" but is instead "a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty
which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain
today... except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments").
150. Id. at 730 (stating that state sovereign immunity "is not directly related to the scope of the
judicial power established by Article 1II, but inheres in the system of federalism established by the
Constitution" and is therefore applicable to Congress's exercise of legislative powers).
151. Id. at 755 (stating that "certain limits are implicit in the constitutional principle of sovereign
immunity," one of which is that "sovereign immunity bars suits only in the absence of consent").
152. Id. at 757-58 (concluding that Maine "has not consented to suit").
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Constitution "preserve[d] the States' traditional immunity from private
suits.' ' 53  By "traditional" immunity, the Court meant the States'
immunity in their own courts, which, of course, predated the
Constitution.'54 The Court reasoned that the immunity that States had
enjoyed in their own courts was preserved in the federal courts for which
the Constitution provided.'5 5 This "preservation" rationale implies that,
under the original Constitution, States would enjoy the same immunity in
the newly authorized federal courts as they had had in their own courts-
i.e., that the States' immunities in the two fora would be symmetrical.'56
The Court began Part Il of its opinion by asserting that state sovereign
immunity restricts not only the powers of the federal judiciary but also
those of Congress. In support of this assertion, the Court cited
decisions, including Seminole Tribe, holding that Congress cannot use
Article I to abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal court.'58 In the
Court's view, "[t]he logic of the decisions.., does not turn on the forum
in which the suits were prosecuted but extends to state-court suits as
well."'59 The Court also cited decisions in which it "described the States'
immunity... without reference to whether the suit was prosecuted in
state or federal court."' 6° These decisions "suggest[ed]" that States enjoy
in their own courts an immunity "analogous" to that enjoyed in federal
court.' The Court reasoned that, because Congress cannot use Article I
153. Id. at 724 (emphasis added).
154. See id. at 715-16 ("Although the American people had rejected other aspects of English
political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal in
the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified."). The court further stated that:
The handful of state statutory and constitutional provisions authorizing suits or petitions of right
against States [in their own courts] only confirms the prevalence of the traditional understanding
that a State could not be sued [in its own courts] in the absence of an express waiver, for if the
understanding were otherwise, the provisions would have been unnecessary.
Id. at 724; see also id. at 742 (stating that sovereign immunity of States from suits in their own
courts "was long established and unquestioned" when ratification of Constitution was being
debated).
155. Id. at 724 (inferring from circumstances of Eleventh Amendment's adoption that "the
country as a whole-which had adopted the Constitution just five years earlier-had not understood
the document to strip the States of their immunity from private suits").
156. See id. at 742 (reasoning that the logic of argument by supporters of Constitution that it
would not subject unconsenting States to suits in federal court "applies with even greater force in the
context of a suit prosecuted against a sovereign in its own courts").
157. Id. at 730-31.
158. Id. at 733 (citing, among other cases, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 745.
161. Id. at 748.
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to abrogate the States' federal-court immunity, it cannot use Article I to
abrogate their state-court immunity, either.1 6
2
After discussing its case law on the States' federal-court immunity and
finding that case law supported "analogous" state-court immunity, the
Alden Court in Part II of its opinion considered "whether a congressional
power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits in their own courts
is consistent with the structure of the Constitution."' 163 The Court found
that the constitutional structure accords States a dignity that is offended
by private suits "regardless of the forum."'' 64 Ultimately, the Court could
not believe that Congress could "require state courts to entertain federal
suits which ... could not be heard in federal courts."'161
In addition to linking the States' state-court immunity to their federal-
court immunity, the Court in Alden linked the States' sovereign
immunity to that of the United States. Part I of the opinion discussed the
founding generation's "universal" acceptance of the English doctrine
"that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent" without
suggesting that this doctrine differed depending on whether the
"sovereign" was a State or the federal government. 166 Part II even more
explicitly linked the States' immunity to that of the United States:
It is unquestioned that the Federal Government retains its own
immunity from suit not only in state tribunals but also in its own
courts. In light of our constitutional system recognizing the
essential sovereignty of the States, we are reluctant to conclude
that the States are not entitled to a reciprocal privilege.
67
Elsewhere in its opinion, moreover, the Alden Court quoted precedent in
which it had equated the sovereign immunity of States to that of the
162. See, e.g., id. at 735 (finding in history of Eleventh Amendment the suggestion that "the
States' sovereign immunity was understood to extend beyond state-law causes of action"); see also
Dan Braveman, Enforcement of Federal Rights Against States: Alden and Federalism Non-sense, 49
AM. U. L. RaV. 611, 646 (2000) (remarking that Alden "appears to adopt a rather curious
,symmetrical' view of federalism" under which "state courts cannot be required to hear FLSA claims
against the states because federal courts cannot be required to do so").
163. Alden, 527 U.S. at 748.
164. Id. at 749.
165 Id. at 754; see also id. at 752 (observing that it would be "anomal[ous]" for "the National
Government [to] wield greater power in the state courts than in its own judicial instrumentalities").
166. Id. at 715; see also id. at 716-17 (quoting Alexander Hamilton's statement in Federalist No.
81 that "[ilt is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent").
167. Id at 749-50; see also id. at 735 ("[S]urely the dissent does not believe that sovereign
immunity poses no bar to a state-law suit against the United States in federal court.").
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federal government."'
Thus, if the Court were to conclude that States are immune from just-
compensation suits brought in federal court (as argued in Part II of this
Article) 169 and that the United States would likewise be immune from
such suits (as some early case law suggests),"' ° Alden would in two ways
support the further conclusion that States are likewise immune from such
suits in their own courts. First, Alden indicates that the States' immunity
in their own courts is coextensive with their immunity in federal court.'
7
'
Second, Alden indicates that the States' immunity corresponds to that of
the United States.
Nonetheless, Alden does not foreclose the thesis of this Article, which
is that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can subject
unconsenting States to suits for just compensation in their own courts. As
mentioned, Part I of the Alden opinion traces the States' sovereign
immunity to the original Constitution; it thus does not prevent the
conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment altered that immunity. 72
Similarly, Part II of the Alden opinion discussed only Congress's power
under Article I to override the States' sovereign immunity; it does not
address whether Congress would have such power under Section 5 of the
168. Id. at 745-46:
It may be accepted as a point of departure unquestioned, that neither a State nor the United
States can be sued as defendant in any court in this country without their consent, except in the
limited class of cases in which a State may be made a party in the Supreme Court of the United
States by virtue of the original jurisdiction conferred on this court by the Constitution.
(quoting Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883)); id. at 750 ("The
principle of immunity from litigation assures the states and the nation from unanticipated
intervention in the processes of government.") (quoting Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47,
53 (1944)).
169. See supra notes 53-91 and accompanying text (discussing case law strongly suggesting that
States are immune from just-compensation suits brought in federal court).
170. See supra notes 116-39 and accompanying text (discussing case law suggesting that United
States is immune from just-compensation suits).
171. The Court in Alden determined that in some ways suits against the States in their own courts
are more threatening to sovereignty interests than are suits against the States in federal court. Alden,
527 U.S. at 749. This determination would support an argument that the States' immunity from just-
compensation claims in their own courts follows afortiori from their federal-court immunity from
such claims. That argument, however, would be hard to reconcile with case law indicating that States
bear the initial responsibility for providing just compensation when they take private property for
public use. See, eg., Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
194 (1985),
172. See supra notes 149 and 153-156 and accompanying text; see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 726-
27 (referring to the "original understanding of the States' constitutional immunity from suit" by the
"founding generation"); id. at 730 (saying that state sovereign immunity "inheres in the system of
federalism established by the Constitution").
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Fourteenth Amendment. 73 Most importantly, the issue before the Court
in Alden concerned a State's immunity from a private action based on an
Article I statute, and the Court's holding was expressly limited to that
situation. 74
The Court in Alden did mention the Fourteenth Amendment in Part III
of its opinion, where it discussed limits on state sovereign immunity. The
Court explained that "[t]he States have consented... to some suits
pursuant to the plan of the Convention or to subsequent constitutional
Amendments."'17' The only amendment that the Court cited was the
Fourteenth Amendment, of which the Court said:
We have held also that in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment,
the people required the States to surrender a portion of the
sovereignty that had been preserved to them by the original
Constitution, so that Congress may authorize private suits
against nonconsenting States pursuant to its § 5 enforcement
power.
76
It may be significant that the Court referred in this passage only to
Congress's power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps this implies that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not abrogate that immunity of its own force. 177 If the
173. See U.S. CONST. amend. XrV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article [i.e., this Amendment]."); see also Alden, 527
U.S. at 730 (stating at outset of Part 11 of the opinion: "In this case we must determine whether
Congress has the power, under Article 1, to subject nonconsenting States to private suits in their own
courts."); id. at 741 (stating at outset of Part II.B of its opinion: "Whether Congress has authority
under Article I to abrogate a State's immunity from suit in its own courts is, then, a question of first
impression.").
174. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 ("We hold that the powers delegated to Congress under Article I
of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States to private
suits for damages in state courts."); id. at 754 ("In light of history, practice, precedent, and the
structure of the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from private suit in their own
courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.").
175. Id. at 755.
176. Id. at 756.
177. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Or. State Bd. of Forestry, 991 P.2d 563, 567 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)
(stating that Alden's "emphasis on positive acts of Congress under section five" might suggest that
Fourteenth Amendment does not, of its own force, subject unconsenting States to just-compensation
claims in their own courts). Compare the description of the Fourteenth Amendment in the passage of
Alden quoted in the text with the description of the Fourteenth Amendment in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1976). In Bitzer, the Court described the substantive provisions, as well as the
enforcement provision, of the Fourteenth Amendment as "contemplat[ing] limitations on [the
States'] authority." Id at 453. The Bitzer Court said that the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
provisions, in particular, "[i]mpressed ... duties" on the States "with respect to their treatment of
private individuals" Id.; see also id. at 456 (observing that, quite apart from Congress's power to
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Court were to so hold, it would reject the thesis of this Article, which is
that the Fourteenth Amendment does indeed, of its own force, sometimes
abrogate state sovereign immunity.
In any event, like the other precedent discussed in this Part of this
Article, Alden supports but does not compel the conclusion that States
are immune from just-compensation suits in their own courts. It is
therefore hoped that this Part has shown that the Court's precedent leaves
room for the argument advanced in the next Part of this Article.
IV. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE CREATES REMEDIAL
OBLIGATIONS THAT SOMETIMES REQUIRE STATES TO
SUFFER JUST-COMPENSATION SUITS IN THEIR OWN
COURTS
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment puts remedial
obligations on the States.'78 Those obligations arise whenever a State
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.' 79 One such deprivation
occurs when a State takes private property for public use.'8° The Court
has said that the State's remedial obligation for this sort of deprivation is
to have made, at the time of its taking of the property, "reasonable,
certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation.' 8 ' This Part
enforce substantive provisions of Fourteenth Amendment, those provisions "themselves embody
significant limitations on state authority"); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66
(1996) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment
and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and
federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment."). The Bitzer Court
characterized Congress's enforcement power as almost ancillary to the substantive provisions:
"Standing behind the imperatives [of the substantive provisions] is Congress' power to 'enforce'
them 'by appropriate legislation."' Id. at 453. In light of this description, it would seem incongruous
to conclude that Section 5 gives Congress the awesome power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
even though the substantive provisions themselves do not; this conclusion would seem to result in
the enforcement tail wagging the substantive dog.
178. This Part of the Article analyzes the nature of those obligations for claims seeking just
compensation. The implications of that analysis for other due process claims are discussed infra
notes 260-328 and accompanying text (Part V.B).
179. See U.S. CoNSr. amend. XIV, § I ("Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.").
180. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 539 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Due Process
and Takings Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments stand directly in opposition to state
action intended to deprive people of their legally protected property interests.... When adequate
remedies are provided and followed, no uncompensated taking or deprivation of property without
due process can result.").
181. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194
(1985); Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 252 (1905); Sweet v.
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argues that a State may well be able to meet this obligation in many cases
without allowing itself to be sued in its own courts; in such cases, the
State can retain its immunity from suits for just compensation in those
courts. If a State fails to create an adequate, alternative way to pay just
compensation, however, the Due Process Clause requires the State's
courts of general jurisdiction to be open to just-compensation suits
against it. Under these circumstances, the Due Process Clause overrides
state sovereign immunity.
A. A State May Be Able To Provide "Reasonable, Certain and
Adequate Provision "for Just Compensation Without Involving Its
Courts
We should take the Court at its word when it says that a State can meet
its due process obligation by creating a just-compensation scheme that is
"reasonable, certain, and adequate."' 82 As the Court has often said, due
process is "flexible."'' 3 The States, in particular, have wide discretion in
devising procedures for providing due process.'84 That discretion is part
of the broader discretion that the people of every State have to structure
their state government however they like, within the limits of the U.S.
Constitution. 85 This latitude includes the State procedures by which
Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 403 (1895); see also Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1,
II (1990) (applying same standard to asserted takings by federal government); Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689 (1981) (same); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 422 (1980)
(same); Reg'l Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974) (same); Albert Hanson Lumber
Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 587 (1923) (same); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pa. R.R., 195 U.S. 540,
568 (1904) (same); Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry., 135 U.S 641, 659 (1890) (same).
182. See supra note 181 (citing eases that state "reasonable, certain, and adequate" standard).
183. E.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) ("Due process, as this Court often has
said, is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation."); Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924,
930 (1997) (describing due process as "flexible").
184. See, e.g., Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 930 (observing that State has broad discretion in providing due
process in connection with disciplining its employees).
185. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999) ("A State is entitled to order the
processes of its own governance, assigning to the political branches, rather than the courts, the
responsibility for directing the payment of debts."); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)
("Through the structure of its government ... a State defines itself as a sovereign."); Highland
Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) ("How power shall be distributed by a state
among its governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a question for the state itself."); see also
Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 919 (1997) (referring to States' authority "to establish the
structure and jurisdiction of their own courts"); cf Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Raygor, 620
N.W.2d 680, 685-87 (Minn. 2001) (holding that State's sovereign immunity prevented 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(d) from tolling statute of limitations for state-court suit against State based on state law),
cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2214 (2001); Bush v. Paragon Property, Inc., 997 P.2d 882, 884-88 (Or. Ct.
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property owners can get just compensation when their property is taken
for public use.'86 All that the Fourteenth Amendment demands is that the
State's compensation procedure be: (1) reasonable-i.e., that it not entail
undue delay, expense, or effort;'87 (2) certain-i.e., that there be no
doubt about its existence or its potential to lead to an award of just
compensation;' 88 and (3) adequate-i.e., that it actually and reliably
result in an award of just compensation when the State has taken private
property for public use.'89
If a State has a nonjudicial compensation scheme that meets these
criteria, the Due Process Clause should not be construed categorically to
compel the State to let itself be sued for compensation in its own
courts. 9 ' For example, a State could create a claims commission in its
App. 2000) (holding that Congress lacked power to require state courts to provide interlocutory
appellate review of orders denying arbitration when state law did not permit such review).
186. See eg., Madisonville Traction, 196 U.S. at 252 ("Speaking generally, it is for the State,
primarily and exclusively, to declare for what local public purposes private property, within its
limits, may be taken upon compensation to the owner, as well as to prescribe a mode in which it may
be condemned and taken."); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236
(1897) ("The legislature may prescribe a form of procedure to be observed in the taking of private
property for public use, but it is not due process of law if provision be not made for compensation.");
see also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 660 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "the Constitution does not embody any specific procedure or form of remedy
that the States must adopt" in meeting their obligations under Just Compensation Clause). Justice
Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas was later adopted by a majority of the Court to the extent that it
argued in favor of government liability for temporary regulatory takings. See First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315, 316 n.9, 318 (1987)
(discussing and citing with approval Justice Brennan's San Diego Gas dissent); see also Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 866-67 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that Court in
First English endorsed Justice Brennan's proposal in San Diego Gas dissent that government owes
just compensation for temporary regulatory takings); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1018 (1992) (describing with approval Justice Brennan's observation in San Diego Gas dissent that,
from property owner's perspective, government's prohibition of all beneficial use of land was
tantamount to physical appropriation).
187. See, e.g., Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 677 (1923) (holding that Just
Compensation Clause is satisfied by "prompt" ascertainment and payment of compensation).
188. Cf. Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 68 (1920) (holding that federal court would not withhold
equitable relief based on speculative state remedy).
189. Cf. Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1922) (holding that due process was not violated
by statute that restricted judicial review of administrative determination of damages caused to
property owner by city's improvement of adjoining street).
190. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative Power, and the Constitution, 65 IND.
LJ. 291, 298 (1990) ("[I]t seems hard to contend that a scheme providing a single, but entirely fair,
administrative determination necessarily denies due process."). The Due Process Clause may well
require that judicial review be available for claims that a State's non-judicial compensation scheme
fails to meet the criteria of (1) reasonableness, (2) certainty, and (3) adequacy. See Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93
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executive branch to handle just-compensation claims. 9' A State could
even authorize its legislature to rule on claims for just compensation and
COLUM. L. REV. 309, 334 (1993) [hereinafter Fallon, Confusions] (observing that judicial review is
usually available for claim that an administrative scheme violates Due Process Clause). In addition,
it is arguable that the Supremacy Clause or Article 1ll, or the two in combination, require that some
federal court be able to review a claim that a state has failed to provide just compensation for a
taking of private property for public use. See Seamon, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 104, at 393
n.363 (suggesting that Supremacy Clause may require that United States Supreme Court be able to
review state adjudications of federal claims); see also Meltzer, supra, at 298-99 (arguing that Article
Ill is more appropriate basis for constitutional right to judicial review); cf, e.g., Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 46, 60 (1932) (suggesting that judicial review of administrative determinations
affecting life, liberty, or property can sometimes be required by Due Process Clause or Article Ill);
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920) (stating that, when property
owner claims that rates that state entity allows it to charge are confiscatory, "the State must provide a
fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own
independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the [rate] order is void because in conflict
with the due process clause"); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial
Review, Sovereign Immunity and the Rehnquist Court, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1283, 1305 (2000)
(appearing to argue that due process generally requires judicial forum); Martin Redish,
Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions
Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REv. 900, 915 & n.61 (1982) (arguing
that due process requires an "independent" court to review constitutional claims); see generally
Woolhandler and Collins, supra note 58, at 628-40 (discussing early eminent domain and rate cases
in which Court found constitutional right, including due-process right, to judicial review).
191. See, e.g., Austin v. Ark. State Highway Comm'n, 895 S.W.2d 941, 942-44 (Ark. 1995)
(holding that sovereign immunity barred just-compensation claim, but property owner could file
claim with state Claims Commission); see also ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 19-10-201 to-210(Repl. 1994)
(authorizing certain claims against State to be heard by executive-branch commission, subject to
review by Arkansas legislature); cf Crane, 258 U.S. at 145-47 (rejecting due process challenge to
state procedure under which damages to plaintiff's property were assessed by municipal officials,
subject to state-court review only on issues of jurisdiction or fraud and willful misconduct by
officials); Comm'rs of Road Improvement v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 257 U.S. 547, 555 (1922) (stating
that "due process of law does not necessarily require judicial machinery to fix values in
condemnation"); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593 (1897) (upholding land-acquisition scheme
under which value of land was determined by commissioners, subject to judicial review); Long
Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 694-95 (1897) (holding that due process did not
require jury to assess damages but was instead satisfied by procedure that permitted award to be
determined by commissioners, subject to judicial review); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U S.
282, 285 (1893) (same); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519 (1883) (upholding federal statute
authorizing state courts to bear condemnation actions brought by federal officials and remarking that
determination of just compensation "may be prosecuted before commissioners or special boards or
the courts .... All that is required is that it shall be conducted in some fair and just manner .... );
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1875) ("The proceeding by the States, in the exercise of
their right of eminent domain, is often had before commissioners of assessment or special boards
appointed for that purpose."). But cf Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312,
327 (1893) (describing amount of just compensation as "judicial" question); but see also United
States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 330-36 (1949) (independently reviewing whether just compensation
resulted from application of administrative regulations prescribing compensation for property
confiscated for wartime use).
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to award compensation by private bills.92 Today, it may seem doubtful
that a non-judicial compensation scheme-particularly a private-bill
scheme-could meet the due process criteria of reasonableness,
certainty, and adequacy. Problems with non-judicial procedures for
adjudicating claims against the government have led in modem times to
the prevalence of judicial procedures.'93  Historically, however,
compensation claims against the government were handled by the
legislative branch, and to a lesser extent by the executive branch, long
before they were assigned to the courts. 94 Given this history and the
flexibility of due process, it would be untenable to conclude that the Due
Process Clause categorically compels judicial resolution of just-
compensation claims. 9 '
B. If a State Does Not Provide an Adequate, Alternative Way To Pay
Just Compensation, the State Can Be Sued for Just Compensation
in Its Own Courts of General Jurisdiction
Section A argued that States can meet their due process obligation by
creating non-judicial schemes of providing just compensation for private
property that the State has taken for public use. The question remains:
What does the Due Process Clause require if a State does not create an
adequate non-judicial compensation scheme and retains its immunity
from just-compensation suits in its own courts?
192. Cf. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 644 n.9
(1999) (noting availability of remedy by private bill from legislature in evaluating state remedies for
State's patent infringement).
193. See WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS: A HISTORY, PART II
8-11 (1978) (describing problems with congressional consideration of claims against the United
States during the first half of the 19th century); Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the
Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 156-57 (1986)
(discussing similar issue).
194. See Seamon, Separation of Powers, supra note 59, at 175-78 & n.97 (discussing history of
federal claims); Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The
Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REv. 625 (1985)
(same); see also James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First
Amendment Right To Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L REv. 899, 903-
62 (1997) (discussing history of legislative and executive handling of claims against government).
195. See Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985) ("The
flexibility in approach in our due process cases is intended in part to allow room for other forms of
dispute resolution [i.e., besides courtroom litigation]."); see also. e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of
California, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (noting that history is relevant to due-process analysis);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-76 (1977) (same); Crane, 258 U.S. at 147 (same, with
specific reference to just-compensation proceedings); Hurtado v. Califomia, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29
(1884) (indicating that historical practice is relevant to due-process analysis).
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In considering that question, it is worth keeping in mind that a person
whose property has been taken for public use can often get some judicial
relief without suing the state directly. Specifically, the property owner
can sue the responsible state officials for money damages out of their
own pockets and an injunction to prevent them from continuing to take
the property without just compensation. 96 These remedies probably are
available in both federal court and the State's own courts. 197 If these
remedies are available in state court and they combine to produce just
compensation in a particular case, the property owner in that case cannot
complain that the State has failed to provide an adequate remedy.' 98
Often, however, an officer suit will not produce just compensation. An
award of damages for any temporary taking will frequently be barred by
196. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text (describing remedies historically available for
uncompensated takings in officer suits) Today, the property owner could seek money damages from
the responsible state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cf, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 694 (1999) (stating that federal-court suit seeking monetary award against
municipality for alleged regulatory taking was brought under Section § 1983). Injunctive relief
against the official would also be available under Section 1983, as well as under the doctrine of Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149-68 (1908). See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)
("Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in § 1983 actions .... "); See
also Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 151-52 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). In Lee,
the taking of property without just compensation was alleged to support the principle authorizing an
officer suit for equitable relief despite state sovereign immunity. See supra notes 60-61 and
accompanying text (discussing Lee) Although the Court applies "ripeness" rules that would
generally prevent a federal-court suit against a state official alleging an uncompensated taking, those
rules would not apply if, as posited in the text, the State failed to provide an adequate process for
obtaining compensation in its own courts. See, e.g., Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (holding that, before suing in federal court, takings
claimant must exhaust state remedies for obtaining just compensation as long as state provides "an
adequate process for obtaining compensation"); see generally Max Kidalov & Richard H. Seamon,
The Missing Pieces of the Debate Over Federal Property Rights Legislation. 27 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1,5-17 (1999) (describing Court's "ripeness" rules for takings claims in federal court).
197. The Court has held that state courts and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
Section 1983 suits. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988). But the Court has "never held
that state courts must entertain § 1983 suits." Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax
Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 591 n.4 (1995) (emphasis added). Even so, "[v]irtually every State has
expressly or by implication opened its courts to § 1983 actions, and there are no state court systems
that refuse to hear § 1983 cases." Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 378 n.20 (1990).
198. Cf Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981) (rejecting plaintiff s argument that tort
remedy against state was inadequate because it did not allow suit against offending officer, because
remedy "fully compensated" plaintiff for his loss); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 746-48
(1974) (finding it unnecessary to decide whether Tax Injunction Act would violate due process as
applied in some situations, because plaintiff in that case had adequate relief).
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official immunity, 99 and sometimes even injunctive relief could be
barred."' When that is true and the State has not created an adequate
nonjudicial scheme for awarding just compensation, the State will have
failed to make "reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining
compensation."'
Under these circumstances, the victim of a taking should be able to sue
the State directly for just compensation in a state court of general
jurisdiction. 22 In such a suit, the plaintiff would have a cause of action
under the Just Compensation Clause, as applicable to States under the
Fourteenth Amendment.20 3 The plaintiff might have to prove that an
officer suit in state court would not yield just compensation and that the
199. See 9 DAVID A. THOMAS, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, § 81.05(d), at 514-15 (2d ed.
1994) (discussing difficulties of overcoming official immunity in just-compensation suits based on
Section 1983).
200. See THOMAS, supra note 199, §81.05(c)(2), at 510-11 (discussing difficulties of obtaining
injunctive relief in takings suits); see also supra notes 73-88 and accompanying text (discussing
Court's refusal to uphold injunctive relief in Hopkins and Belknap because of its interference with
government property); cf. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,281-88 (1997) (holding that
federal-court officer suit for injunctive and declaratory relief by Native American Tribe was barred
by sovereign immunity because it was equivalent to a quiet title action to which State had not
consented); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.11 (1949) (noting
that injunctive relief in officer suit would be barred "if the relief requested can not be granted by
merely ordering the cessation of the conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by the
sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property"); Westside Mothers v. Haveman,
133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 560-75 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that sovereign immunity barred Ex parte
Young relief against state officials who administered Medicaid program).
201. See supra note 181 (citing cases articulating the "reasonable, certain, and adequate"
standard).
202. Cf. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218 (1882) (describing claim based on Just
Compensation Clause as being "of that character which it is intended the courts shall enforce");
Jackson, The Supreme Court, supra note 18, at 117 (arguing from Court's precedent that "a remedy
for unlawful government conduct," including takings of private property for public use, should be
provided "if there [is] a jurisdictional basis for doing so"). A state court is said to have "general
jurisdiction" when it has power under state law "to hear a wide range of cases, civil or criminal, that
arise within its geographic area." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 856 (7th ed. 1999). All States have
such courts. See P. BARNES, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S DESK REFERENCE ON THE AMERICAN
COURTS 173 (2000) ("All states have at least one court of general jurisdiction .... ); BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, STATE COURT
ORGANIZATION: 1998 15-17 (2000) (Table 3). Although sovereign immunity ordinarily could be
said to restrict a state court's jurisdiction, that restriction would have to be ignored when the
assertion of sovereign immunity would violate a State's obligations under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that state court of otherwise
competent jurisdiction was obligated to hear federal claim, despite state policy of not enforcing
penal laws of foreign jurisdiction).
203. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
315-16 (1987); see also supra notes 19-42 and 49 and accompanying text (discussing First
English).
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State did not provide any adequate, nonjudicial procedure for the
plaintiff to get it.2°4 If those conditions are proven, the State should not
be allowed to assert sovereign immunity as a defense. That is because, if
a state court honored that defense, the state court would cause the State
to deny "reasonable, certain, and adequate provision" for payment of just
compensation. 2 ' Because that result would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, the state court would have to reject the State's sovereign
immunity defense.0 6
Some commentary has suggested that it is the Supremacy Clause,
207
rather than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that
requires state courts to entertain federal claims against their own States
despite sovereign immunity. 208  In light of Alden, however, the
Supremacy Clause cannot serve as a deus ex machina219 that compels
state courts to choose the just-compensation principle over the sovereign
immunity principle on the theory that sovereign immunity is merely a
creature of state law that is preempted by the federal just-compensation
principle. Alden establishes that a State's immunity in its own courts
204 Cf Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 586-92 (1995)
(holding that declaratory and injunctive relief for unconstitutional state taxes was not available in
state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if state law provided adequate remedy); McKesson Corp. v. Div.
of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 50 (1990) (stating in dicta that States can impose
reasonable restrictions on state-court remedies for unconstitutional state taxes).
205. See supra note 181 (citing cases articulating the "reasonable, certain, and adequate"
standard).
206. Cf Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109 (1994) ("[A] denial by a state court of a recovery of
taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by compulsion is itself in
contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 369
(1930)).
207. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
208. See. e.g., Grant, supra note 19, at 199-200 (contending that, because "the sovereign
Constitution stands supreme," Just Compensation Clause "abrogates" federal sovereign immunity);
Katz, supra note 18, at 1492-93 (arguing that Supremacy Clause obligates state courts to hear
federal claims against States because of "[t]he absence of a broad constitutionally based state
immunity" in state court); Gordon & Gross, supra note 18, at 1171-74 (similarly relying on
Supremacy Clause to argue that state courts must hear federal claims against the State and state
officers, notwithstanding sovereign immunity). But see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999)
(holding that States do have immunity in their own courts that is derived from U.S. Constitution).
209. A "deus ex machina" is "a person or thing... that appears or is introduced suddenly and
unexpectedly and provides a contrived solution to an apparently insoluble difficulty." MERRIAM
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 316 (19th ed. 1993) ("deus ex machina," definition 2).
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derives from the U.S. Constitution, as does the just-compensation
principle.2"' Thus, the Supremacy Clause does not cause one principle to
trump the other.
A state court must choose the just-compensation principle over the
sovereign-immunity principle not because of the Supremacy Clause, but
because sovereign immunity is "a part of the Constitution, of equal
authority with every other, but no greater."' Sovereign immunity and
the Fourteenth Amendment each get their due "authority" if the
Fourteenth Amendment is construed as generally permitting a State to
meet its remedial obligations under that Amendment in ways other than
letting itself be sued directly for money. This is why it is appropriate, in
particular, to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to permit a State to
provide just compensation through non-judicial procedures (as well as
through officer suits).2" That interpretation preserves the essence of
sovereign immunity, which, at its core, protects the sovereign from being
called upon by a court to honor its monetary obligations. Sovereign
immunity cannot eliminate those obligations, however, when those
obligations, like sovereign immunity itself, arise from the Constitution.
To avoid giving sovereign immunity higher "authority" than the
Fourteenth Amendment obligation to pay just compensation, the
immunity must yield when the State has not met that obligation in ways
that do not implicate sovereign immunity.2"3 A contrary conclusion
would pervert the federal system established by the Constitution.2 4 A
central purpose of the federal system is to protect individual liberty
through the diffusion of power to the States.215 Thus, state sovereignty is
210. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 730 (saying that state sovereign immunity "inheres in the system
of federalism established by the Constitution"); id. at 754 ("In light of history, practice, precedent,
and the structure of the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from private suit in
their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I
legislation."); see also supra notes 140-77 and accompanying text (discussing Alden).
211. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 286 (1885) (emphasis added).
212. See supra notes 179-95 (arguing that States can meet their obligation to provide procedures
for paying just compensation without letting themselves be sued in their own courts).
213. See Fallon, Confusions, supra note 190, at 338 ("[T]he Constitution in general and the Due
Process Clause in particular do sometimes require individually effective remediation for
constitutional violations. In such cases, competing doctrines, including sovereign and official
immunity, must give way.") (footnotes omitted).
214. Cf Jackson, The Supreme Court, supra note 18, at 114-16 (arguing that state sovereign
immunity should be understood to create a preference against monetary remedies against the States,
which would be overcome "where the supremacy of constitutional law" requires).
215. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 758 (attributing to Framers of Constitution "the unique insight that
freedom is enhanced by the creation of two governments, not one"); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 921 (1997) ("This separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution's structural
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protected from federal incursion to preserve individual rights, not vice
versa.
2 1
6
One could argue that this conclusion gives more "authority" to the
Fourteenth Amendment than to the States' constitutionally based
immunity. To the contrary, the conclusion reflects that sovereign
immunity gives the States only the privilege of not being called upon by
courts, at the instance of private plaintiffs, to honor their obligations.
Sovereign immunity is a protective device that can be used against
private lawsuits, not a destructive device that can be used to eliminate the
constitutional rights of individuals.
C. Case Law Supports the Conclusion that an Unconsenting State Can
Be Sued in Its Own Courts of General Jurisdiction if It Fails To
Make an Adequate, Alternate Provision for Just Compensation
The most direct support for the analysis advanced in Section B comes
from Supreme Court cases on state taxation. The Court has held that the
Due Process Clause does not require a State to let a taxpayer challenge a
state tax before it is collected. Instead, the State may compel the taxpayer
to pay the tax first and challenge it later."7 When the State exerts that
compulsion, however, the Court has said that the procedural component
protections of liberty."); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) ("[T]he Constitution
divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.").
216. If a state court, contrary to the analysis described in the text, erroneously accepted the State's
sovereign-immunity defense, the property owner would be entitled, after pursuing appeals through
the state-court system, to appellate review by the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(a) (authorizing United States Supreme Court to review final judgments rendered by "the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be had" where "any title, right, privilege, or
immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution"); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 26-31 (1990) (holding that "[tihe Eleventh
Amendment does not constrain the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases arising
from state courts"); see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 310-13 (1987) (holding that Court could review state-court decision denying
compensation for temporary regulatory taking).
217. See, e.g., Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 587 (1995)
("As long as state law provides a clear and certain remedy, the States may determine whether to
provide predeprivation process (e.g., an injunction) or instead to afford post-deprivation relief (e.g.,
a refund) ...") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106,
110-11 (1994) (stating that Due Process Clause gives State "the flexibility to maintain an
exclusively predeprivation remedial scheme" for wrongfully collected taxes, as well as "an
exclusively postdeprivation regime"); McKesson, 496 U.S. at 37 ("[Ilt is well established that a State
need not provide predeprivation process for the exaction of taxes."); id. at 51 (holding that, when
State compels taxpayer to pay taxes before challenging them, State's post-deprivation procedure
must provide "a clear and certain remedy") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of the Due Process Clause obligates the State to provide a "clear and
certain remedy" for any erroneous tax collection." 8 The Court has also
said that this remedy must, in some cases, take the form of a refund of
the erroneously collected taxes.2 19 Thus, the procedural due process
requirements for erroneously collected taxes parallel those for
governmental takings of private property for public use: The State does
not have to provide a procedure for challenging the government's
deprivation of taxes or property (or its taking of private property for a
public use) before the deprivation (or taking) occurs. The State does,
however, have to provide a post-deprivation procedure that is "clear and
certain" and that can result in an award of money from the state
treasury.'2 Ordinarily, States provide a post-deprivation remedy by
letting themselves be sued for tax refunds in their own courts.22'
Admittedly, the Court's tax decisions would have to be extended to
support the conclusion that, in the absence of an adequate alternative, an
unconsenting State can be sued for just compensation in its own courts.
For one thing, the Court has not yet extended this case law outside the
tax context.22 2 For another thing, even limited to the tax context, the
218. Newsweek, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 522 U.S. 442, 445 (1998); Nat 7 Private Truck
Council, 515 U.S. at 587; Reich, 513 U.S. at 106; McKesson, 496 U.S. at 40; Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280,285 (1912).
219. See Newsweek, 522 U.S. at 444-45 (holding that taxpayer was entitled to refund in light of
state statutory provisions that appeared to authorize that remedy); Nat ' Private Truck Council, 515
U.S. at 587-92 (holding that, where state law provided for refund required by due process, state
court could refuse to award declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Reich, 513
U.S. at 111-14 (taxpayer was entitled to refund in state court given statutory provisions authorizing
that relief, despite later state court's interpretation of those provisions as not authorizing refunds);
McKesson, 496 U.S. at 39 (observing that, if state tax were beyond State's power to impose, or
imposed on an entity immune from taxation, "[t]he State would have had no choice but to 'undo' the
unlawful deprivation by refunding the tax").
220. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L REV. 1733, 1825-26 (1991) (recognizing parallel between
constitutionally required remedies for wrongfully collected taxes and governmental takings of
private property for public use). Despite the parallel described in the text, the Due Process Clause
protects all "property," whereas the Just Compensation Clause protects only "private property." The
latter term excludes money that does not take the form of specific funds, see Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540, 544 (1998) (five Justices concluding that Just Compensation Clause does
not apply to law that imposes financial liability), and it also excludes interests in government
entitlements, i.e., "new property." Cf. Robert Brauneis, Eastern Enterprises, Phillips, Money, and the
Limited Role of the Just Compensation Clause in Protecting Property "In Its Larger and Juster
Meaning," 51 ALA. L REV. 937, 938 (2000) (arguing that Just Compensation Clause protects
"ordinary objects").
221. See Reich, 513 U.S. at 112 ("States ordinarily prefer that taxpayers pursue only
postdeprivation remedies-i.e., that taxpayers 'pay first, litigate later."') (emphasis omitted).
222. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 18, at 1825-26 (observing that Court has not applied its
decisions requiring refunds in tax cases to other contexts); see also The Supreme Court, 1989 Term:
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Court's tax cases need not be read to mean that the Fourteenth
Amendment overrides state sovereign immunity. In all of the cases in
which the Court has cited the "clear and certain remedy" principle to
sustain tax-refund suits against States brought in state court, the State has
waived its immunity by allowing itself be sued for a refund in its own
courts.223 Thus, the cases may mean only that the Due Process Clause
"requires a State to provide the remedy it has promised.'224 The Court
has never construed the Due Process Clause to require state courts to
refund taxes paid to a State that has not waived its immunity from such
suits.2 25 Likewise, the Court has never held that a state court can award
just compensation from the treasury of an unconsenting State.22 6
The extension of the tax cases urged here accords with case law
holding or suggesting that sometimes a State can satisfy its due process
obligations by letting its officers, rather than the State itself, be sued in
Leading Cases, 104 HARv. L. REv. 129, 197 (1990) (remarking that McKesson "may not be
generalizable").
223. See McKesson, 496 U.S at 49 n.34 (noting that Florida "concede[d] that the State waived
any sovereign immunity"); see also Seamon, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 104, at 399 n.394
(citing McKesson and later cases).
224. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,740 (1999) (emphasis added); accord Hudson v. Palmer, 468
US. 517, 539 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The due process requirement means that
government must provide to the inmate the remedies it promised would be available.") (emphasis
added); see also Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 804 (1996) ("Whether acting through
its judiciary or through its legislature, a State may not deprive a person of all existing remedies for
the enforcement of a right, which the State has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded
to him some real opportunity to protect it.") (emphasis added) (quoting Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust &
Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 682 (1930)); cf FALLON, supra note 19, 1999 SUPPLEMENT, at 135
(questioning whether Alden "suggests that the state could plead sovereign immunity in its own courts
if no state remedy appeared to be available and the doors of the federal courts were similarly
closed").
225. Compare Reich v. Collins, in which the Court held that, once a taxpayer had paid taxes
relying on existing state law that appeared clearly to authorize refund actions against the State, a
State could not decide that no such remedy existed and that the taxpayer should have challenged the
taxes before they were collected. Reich, 513 U.S. at 110-14. The Court considered this an
unconstitutional "bait and switch" tactic. Id. at 11; see also Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust, 281 U S. at
674-82 (holding that due process was violated by state-court decision that had the effect of
preventing taxpayer from raising federal challenge to tax). As Professor Wells has observed, the
State in Reich did not raise sovereign immunity as a defense to the refund action. See Michael Wells,
Suing States, supra note 18, at 779; see generally Ann Woolhandler, Old Property, New Property,
and Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 919, 928-29 (2000) [hereinafter Woolhandler,
Old Property] (demonstrating that, with possible exception of Reich, the Court has required states to
provide remedies against themselves in their own courts only "where the state had substituted
remedies against itself' for remedies against its officers).
226. See supra notes 53-91 and accompanying text (demonstrating, in Part II of this Article, that
the Court has never decided whether sovereign immunity bars just-compensation claim against an
unconsenting State).
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state court. 7 As discussed above, officer suits could indeed yield just
compensation in some cases."~ In those cases, the victim of a taking
may not be constitutionally entitled to sue the State directly. In many
cases, however, officer suits would not produce just compensation.
Official immunity could prevent damage awards against officers for any
taking that has already occurred,229 and, in any event, many officers
would be judgment proof.3 Moreover, injunctive relief against
continued takings would not always be available." Officer suits
therefore would not always satisfy the Due Process Clause requirement
that a State provide a "reasonable, certain, and adequate" procedure for
paying just compensation every time it takes private property for public
use. In cases in which the Court has held that post-deprivation officer
suits satisfied due process, the plaintiff failed to show that this remedy
was inadequate. 2
Moreover, the cases in which the Court has found that officer suits
satisfy due process differ in two important ways from cases involving
claims for just compensation. First, the nature of the government action
that caused the deprivation in these cases differed from governmental
takings of private property for public use. Specifically, they involved
"random and unauthorized" deprivations by state officials.33 In contrast,
a taking of private property triggers a right to just compensation only
227. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990) ("In some circumstances ... the Court has
held that... a common-law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation, satisfies due process.").
228. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing official immunity as limit on
monetary relief in actions based on uncompensated taking).
230. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 n.36 (1980); cf. Scott v. Donald, 165
U.S. 107, 109 (1897) (plaintiffs alleging that defendants "were wholly irresponsible financially, and
unable to respond in damages" in successfully seeking federal court injunction against state officer's
enforcement of unconstitutional tax laws).
231. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing limits on injunctive relief in officer
suits based on uncompensated taking).
232. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 535-36 (1984) (holding that due process was satisfied
by existence of state tort remedy against officer who had destroyed plaintiff's property); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674-82 (1977) (holding that due process was satisfied by availability of state
tort remedy for improper corporal punishment of public school student); see also N. Am. Cold
Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 314-16 (1908) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled
to notice and hearing before health officials shut down facility suspected of harboring unwholesome
food, while observing that plaintiff would be able to sue state officials afterwards).
233. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982) (distinguishing cases
involving random and unauthorized deprivations by state officials from case before it, in which
deprivation occurred under "established state procedure").
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when it is authorized by state law.3 It is arguably fairer to require the
State itself to pony up for a deprivation that it authorizes than for a
deprivation that it does not authorize.235 That is especially true when the
state-authorized deprivation consists of a taking of private property for
public use. That type of deprivation, by its nature, benefits the public.
236
With that sort of deprivation, it is fair to make the public treasury pay the
bill.237 More fundamentally, a violation of the Just Compensation Clause
differs from all other constitutional violations in that the Just
Compensation Clause "dictates" a monetary remedy for every
governmental taking of private property for public use.23" Furthermore,
the Clause seems to contemplate that this compensation will come from
the public funds of government entities that authorize the taking, and not
from its officers' personal funds.239  Besides governmental takings of
234. See, e.g., United States v. N. Am. Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330, 333 (1920) ("In
order that the Government shall be liable [for just compensation] it must appear that the officer who
has physically taken possession of the property was duly authorized so to do, either directly by
Congress or by the official upon whom Congress conferred the power.").
235. Cf., e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997) (municipal
liability under Section 1983 cannot be based on respondeat superior but instead generally requires
proof of custom or policy). But cf Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 282-
96 (1913) (holding that action under color of state law could violate Fourteenth Amendment even if
it violated state law). Under Home Telephone, the fact that a state official's conduct violates state
law cannot matter in determining whether a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment has occurred,
but I believe that this fact can play a role in determining the remedy required for that violation. This
Article traces the States' remedial obligation to the procedural component of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and identifies the main goal of that Clause as ensuring accuracy. If
one accepts that approach, then it seems sensible in crafting the remedy to consider whether the
violation is the result of the conduct of a rogue official or more systemic.
236. See, e.g., Flaw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1984).
237. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth Amendment's guarantee
[of just compensation] ... was designed to bar the government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.");
see also United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947) (relying on principle that Just
Compensation Clause "expresses a principle of fairness" to reject government's argument that taking
claim was barred by statute of limitations).
238. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9
(1987).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 77 (1982) (stating that Just
Compensation Clause requires government to use eminent domain power to take private property for
public use "so that, through taxation, the burden of the relief afforded in the public interest may be
borne by the public") (quoting Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602
(1935)); Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (stating that "public as a whole" is meant to bear burden-i.e., of
paying compensation-when government takes private property for public use); United States v.
Gettysburg Elec. Ry. 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896) (reasoning that potential for government's abuse of
its taking power is diminished by fact that just compensation for taking "must be raised by
taxation"); THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS § 11.3 1.1, at 377 (Neil H. Cogan ed. 1997) (quoting
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private property for public use, no other deprivation subject to the Due
Process Clause is also subject to a constitutional provision that demands
governmental compensation for every such deprivation.24
D. Due Process Can Create an Asymmetry Between a State's
Immunity from Suits Brought in Its Own Courts and Its Immunity
from Suits Brought in Federal Court
This Part of the Article has argued that an unconsenting State can be
sued for just compensation in its own courts of general jurisdiction if it
fails to implement an adequate, alternative way of paying just
compensation for property that it has taken for public use. That
argument, if accepted, creates an asymmetry between the States'
immunity in their own courts and their immunity in federal court. It
would subject States to suits in their own courts that, under the analysis
advanced in Part II, could not be brought in federal court.24'
Blackstone's statement that, when government takes property involuntarily, the legislature must
provide "full indemnification" to property owner); Joseph L Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE LJ. 36, 54 (1964) (quoting 17th century view of Grotius that 'just satisfaction" for land taken
by eminent domain should be paid "out of the common stock"); William B. Stoebuck, A General
Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L REV. 553, 566-67, 572-88 (1972) (discussing historical
basis for requirement of compensation from government for its taking of private property for public
use).
240. This does not mean that the Just Compensation Clause creates the only substantive right for
which the Due Process Clause requires a monetary remedy. As discussed supra notes 217-21 and
accompanying text, and infra notes 300-314 and accompanying text, the Due Process Clause has
been construed to mandate a monetary remedy in at least one other context-namely, as a remedy
for state taxes collected in violation of federal law. The Clause may very well dictate monetary
remedies in other contexts, too, but the identification of those contexts is complicated by the absence
of explicit guidance in the text of the Constitution.
241. See supra notes 53-91 and accompanying text (arguing in Part II that sovereign immunity
bars just-compensation suits brought against States in federal court); cf. Reich, 513 U.S. at 110
(noting that, while Constitution bars state courts from denying recovery of state taxes collected in
violation of federal law, "the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts
notwithstanding," the States' Eleventh Amendment in federal court "does generally bar tax refund
claims from being brought in that forum") (dicta). Quite apart from the restriction on suits seeking
monetary relief that is imposed by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, an additional restriction is
imposed by the provisions in many states constitutions that, like the U.S. Constitution, prohibit
payments from the treasury except by legislative appropriation. See James M. Hirschhom, Where the
Money Is: Remedies To Finance Compliance with Strict Structural Injunctions, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1815, 1837-38 n.120 (1984) (stating that most state constitutions forbid disbursements from state
treasury except by appropriation statute); cf U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9, cl. 7 (Appropriations Clause).
Under the analysis proposed here, these state constitutional provisions could not prevent a state court
of general jurisdiction from awarding just compensation against the State, in the absence of an
adequate, alternative compensation procedure, for the same reason that the State's sovereign
immunity could not prevent such an award. A state court's reliance on these state constitutional
provisions to deny just compensation would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fallon &
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This asymmetry is justified by the differing roles of the state courts
and federal courts when it comes to the States' obligations under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause
obligates the sovereign that takes private property for public use to make
"reasonable, certain and adequate provision" for awarding just
compensation to the property owner.242 The "taking" sovereign can use
its own courts to meet this obligation. The obligation cannot be met,
however, by the courts of another sovereign. 24 3 Thus, state courts have a
primary role in ensuring their State's compliance with the Just
Compensation Clause, which is part of the broader role in safeguarding
constitutional rights contemplated for those courts by the Framers of the
Constitution.24
Of course, a federal court can often provide effective remedies for a
State's violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, despite the sovereign immunity that States enjoy from suits
brought in federal court.245  Specifically, remedies against the state
officials who are responsible for the violation may be available in federal
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits money judgments payable
out of the officials' own pockets, or under the doctrine of Ex parte
Young, which permits injunctive relief against the officials.246 This
Article should not be read to endorse any restriction on those federal-
court remedies. 247 Rather, its point is that the availability of federal-court
remedies does not excuse a State's failure to provide its own remedies-
either in its courts or by some other means-to the extent required by the
Meltzer, supra note 18, at 1786 ("[Tihe Supreme Court has sometimes compelled state courts to
provide constitutional remedies despite a lack of state law authority for them to do so.").
242. See supra note 181 (citing case law establishing requirement of "reasonable, certain, and
adequate provision" for payment of just compensation); see also infra notes 260-325 (explaining
that this requirement stems from doctrine of procedural due process).
243. Cf District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 (1973) ("actions of the Federal
Government and its officials are beyond the purview of the [Fourteenth] Amendment").
244. Because Article III of the Constitution gave Congress discretion whether or not to create the
lower federal courts, state courts were bound to have major responsibility for protecting individual
constitutional rights. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953) (stating that, under
original Constitution, state courts were supposed to be "the primary guarantors of constitutional
nghts").
245. See supra notes 53-91 and accompanying text (Part II).
246. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
247. Nor should it be read to cast doubt on the U.S. Supreme Court's exercise of appellate
jurisdiction over decisions in state-court cases in which just compensation is sought from a State. See
supra note 216.
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.248
V. IMPLICATIONS OF DUE PROCESS CONSTRAINTS ON
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Part IV concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment can override the States' immunity from just-compensation
suits brought in their own courts. This Part discusses the implications of
that conclusion and of the analysis underlying it. As explained in Section
A, the conclusion is directly relevant, because many States have not
clearly waived their immunity from all just-compensation claims. In
addition, as discussed in Section B, the analysis is relevant in analyzing
the States' ability to use sovereign immunity to avoid other obligations
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Section
C explains, because the proposed analysis rests on the Due Process
Clause, it applies to the federal government as well as to the States.
Finally, Section D discusses the implications of the analysis proposed
248. This Part of the Article has argued that the States' immunity in their own courts is
overridden in some circumstances by their obligation under the procedural component of the Due
Process Clause to establish procedures for meeting their substantive obligation to pay just
compensation. It is the Article's reliance on procedural due process, in combination with the
substantive obligation imposed by the Just Compensation Clause, that results in the asymmetry
between the State's immunity in their own courts and their immunity in federal court. This
asymmetry would not arise if-as many commentators believe the Court concluded in First English,
see supra note 19 (citing commentary)-the Just Compensation Clause, standing alone, were
interpreted to override state sovereign immunity. In that event, sovereign immunity presumably
would not bar a suit against a State for just compensation regardless whether the suit were brought in
federal court or in state court. (A just-compensation suit in federal court could, however, be barred
by the Court's "ripeness" rules. See note 196 supra (discussing Court's ripeness rules).) This
Article's reliance on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than on the Just
Compensation Clause standing alone, is consistent with the expression of doubt by a plurality of the
Court in Del Monte Dunes whether sovereign immunity "retains its vitality in cases where th[e]
[Fourteenth] Amendment is applicable." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 714
(1999) (plurality opinion). This doubt suggests that sovereign immunity could be overridden to
protect other substantive obligations applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment. This
Article's analysis is also consistent with the case law of the Court that, this Article has argued in Part
II, virtually compels the conclusion that the Just Compensation Clause does not, of its own force,
override the States' sovereign immunity from actions brought in federal court. See supra notes 53-
91 and accompanying text (Part II). By proposing an analysis that is consistent with my
understanding of precedent, I do not mean to imply that an alternative analysis would be illogical. As
Professor Meltzer remarked in a personal communication with me, "the Court might take the view
that (a) the express grant of a compensatory remedy for a takings should be viewed as incompatible
with sovereign immunity, while (b) whatever remedies may be implied as appropriate under the Due
Process Clause are subordinate to sovereign immunity." E-Mail from Daniel J. Meltzer, Professor of
Law, Harvard Law School, to Richard H. Seamon, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of S.C. (Mar.
5, 2001) (on file with author). I agree with this observation, while believing that such a ruling would
be difficult to reconcile with the case law discussed in this Article.
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here for Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. State Waivers of Immunity from Just-Compensation Claims
This Article addresses whether an unconsenting State can be sued for
just compensation. That issue does not matter in States that have enacted
legislation waiving the State's immunity from all just-compensation suits
in their courts.2 49 There are three other categories of States in which the
issue does matter: (1) States in which it is unclear whether, as a matter of
state law, the State has waived immunity from all just-compensation
249. At least two States, New York and Utah, expressly waive their immunity from just-
compensation claims. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 9(2) (McKinney 2001) (empowering court of claims
to hear monetary claims "against the state for the appropriation of any real or personal property or
interest therein"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10.5(1) (1997) (providing that "immunity from suit of
all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity
when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses without just
compensation"). Other States have statutes that expressly authorize inverse-condemnation claims
against the State under at least some circumstances. For example, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79,
§ 10 (West 2001) authorizes an inverse-condemnation action
when the real estate of any person has been taken for the public use or has been damaged by the
construction, maintenance, operation, alteration, repair or discontinuance of a public
improvement or has been entered for a public purpose, but such taking, entry or damage was not
effected by or in accordance with a formal vote or order of the board of officers of a body politic
or corporate duly authorized by law, or when the personal property of any person has been
damaged, seized, destroyed or used for a public purpose.
See also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42A-I-2(H) & 42A-1-29 (Michie 1994) (authorizing inverse-
condemnation actions against any "person," including a governmental entity, that is authorized to
exercise eminent domain); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 40A-3 & 40A-51 (1999) (authorizing inverse-
condemnation actions against certain entities with eminent domain power); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, §§ 1-502(e), 1-511 to 1-518 (West 1997) (authorizing condemnee whose land has been taken
without institution of eminent domain proceeding to file petition triggering assessment of just
compensation by "viewers," subject to judicial review). Still other States have statutes that waive
their sovereign immunity in more general terms. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 945 (West 2001) ("A
public entity may sue and be sued."); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8 (1999) (authorizing claims
against State to be asserted in court of claims); MICH. COMP. LAWS 600.6419 (2000) (same); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A)(1) (Anderson 2000) (same); see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41.031 (Michie 1999) (broadly waiving State's sovereign immunity from private actions in its own
courts). Even in States with statutes that, specifically or in general terms, waive sovereign immunity
from just-compensation claims, state courts may construe the statutes in a way that may preserve
sovereign immunity from certain just-compensation claims. See. e.g., In re Condemnation of 2719,
21, 11 E. Berkshire St., 343 A.2d 67, 69 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (holding that Pennsylvania statute
authorizing inverse-condemnation actions does not apply because plaintiffs failed to allege
government defendant was lawfully exercising power of eminent domain); see also, e.g., Reynolds
v. State, 471 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ohio 1984) (stating that Ohio Court of Claims Act does not waive
sovereign immunity from claims based on State executives' exercise of discretionary authority).
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suits brought in its courts;'50 (2) States in which it is clear that the State
has retained its immunity from at least some just-compensation claims
brought against it in state court;25' and (3) States in which it has been the
state courts, rather than the legislatures, that have decided to abrogate
state-court immunity from just-compensation claims. It is obvious
250. See MANDELKER, supra note 1, § 4A.02[5][d] ("[I]n many states the availability of a
compensation remedy in land use cases is not clear."); see also, e.g., New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe
County, 985 F.2d 1488, 1493 n.12 (1lth Cir. 1993) (noting uncertainty in Florida case law about
whether courts recognize cause of action in inverse condemnation for temporary takings), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 964 (1993); Austin v. City and County of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir.
1987) (observing that there was no Hawaii case law either establishing or rejecting existence of
inverse condemnation cause of action); see generally Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)
("In deciding whether a State has waived its [sovereign immunity], we will find a waiver only where
stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will]
leave no room for any other reasonable construction.") (internal quotation marks omitted; brackets
supplied by the Court).
251. See Austin v. Ark. State Highway Comm'n, 895 S.W.2d 941, 942-44 (Ark. 1995), cited
supra note 191; Hise v. State, 968 S.W.2d 852, 853-55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that inverse
condemnation claim against State was barred by sovereign immunity), appeal denied (Apr. 6, 1998).
252. See, e.g., Barber v. State, 703 So. 2d 314, 317-22 (Ala. 1997) (reversing summary judgment
for State in case asserting inverse-condemnation claim; noting that such claims are not barred by
state constitutional provision establishing sovereign immunity); City of Kenai v. Bumett, 860 P.2d
1233, 1238-39 (Alaska 1993) (apparently identifying state constitution's just-compensation
provision as source for causes of action in inverse condemnation); Bd. of Comm'rs v. Adler, 194 P.
621, 622-24 (Colo. 1920) (holding that state constitution's just-compensation provision overrode
state's sovereign immunity); Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 355 A.2d 307, 311-13 (Conn. 1974) (holding
that sovereign immunity did not bar suits seeking declaration that State owed plaintiff just
compensation and stating in dicta that damages would also be available); State ex rel. Smith v.
0.24148, 0,23831 & 0.12277 Acres of Land, 171 A.2d 228, 231 (Del. 1961) (holding that state
constitution's just-compensation provision was self-executing waiver of state's sovereign immunity
from just-compensation claims); Columbia County v. Doolittle, 512 S.E.2d 236, 237 (Ga. 1999)
(interpreting state constitution's just-compensation provision as waiving sovereign immunity);
Deisher v. Kan. Dep't of Transp., 958 P.2d 656, 662-63 (Kan. 1998) (discussing development of
inverse condemnation in Kansas); Dep't of Highways v. Corey, 247 S.W.2d 389, 389-91 (Ky. 1952)
(holding that sovereign immunity did not bar claim against state agency based on state constitution's
just-compensation provisions); Foss v. Me. Turnpike Auth., 309 A.2d 339, 343-45 (Me. 1973)
(holding that state sovereign immunity did not bar claim for just compensation against state agency);
Dep't of Natural Res. v. Welsh, 521 A.2d 313, 315-19 (Md. 1986) (holding that sovereign immunity
did not bar quiet title action against state agency alleging unlawful taking of private property); State
ex rel. Peterson v. Bentley, 12 N.W.2d 347, 357 (Minn. 1943) (holding that sovereign immunity did
not bar just-compensation claim for taking of land outside of State, and stating in dicta that
sovereign immunity would not bar just-compensation claim for taking of land inside State),
overruled in part on other grounds sub nom. State by Peterson v. Anderson, 19 N.W.2d 70 (Minn.
1945); Williams v. Walley, 295 So. 2d 286, 288 (Miss. 1974) (holding that sovereign immunity did
not protect governmental entity from just-compensation claim in light of self-executing nature of
state constitutional guarantee of just compensation); McGrew v. Granite Bituminous Paving Co.,
155 S.W. 411, 415 (Mo. 1912) (holding that state constitution's just-compensation provision was
"self-enforcing" and therefore party whose property had been taken could resort to any common-law
remedy that would provide adequate relief for violation of provision; not addressing sovereign
immunity); Alexander v. State, 381 P.2d 780, 781-82 (Mont. 1963) (rejecting sovereign-immunity
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why the issue is relevant in the first two categories of States. This section
explains why the issue is relevant to the third category.
State-court decisions holding that the State has waived its state-court
immunity from just-compensation suits cannot necessarily be regarded as
settling the issue, for two reasons. First, some of these decisions rest on
the same mistake that many commentators have made; they fail to
distinguish the issue of whether the Just Compensation Clause creates a
monetary cause of action from the issue of whether that Clause overrides
sovereign immunity.5 3 Even if that mistake were not obvious before (in
defense to taking claim and holding that state constitutional guarantee ofjust compensation was self-
executing); Nine Mile Irrigation Dist. v. State, 225 N.W. 679, 681-83 (Neb. 1929) (holding that
sovereign immunity did not bar just compensation claim against State based on state constitution's
guarantee of just compensation); Sibson v. State, 282 A.2d 664, 665 (N.H. 1971) (holding that
sovereign immunity did not bar claim for just compensation); DeBruhl v. State Highway & Pub.
Works Comm'n, 102 S.E.2d 229, 238 (N.C. 1958) (quoting with approval case from another
jurisdiction rejecting sovereign-immunity defense against payment of interest as component of just
compensation); Minch v. City of Fargo, 297 N.W.2d 785, 789 (N.D. 1980) (construing state
constitution's just-compensation provision to create cause of action in inverse condemnation);
Williams v. State, 998 P.2d 1245, 1248-52 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (describing inverse-
condemnation action in Oklahoma as predominantly judicial creation); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Or.
State Bd. of Forestry, 991 P.2d 563, 566-69 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment required state courts to entertain just-compensation claim against Oregon);
Harris v. Town of Lincoln, 668 A.2d 321, 326-28 (R.I. 1995) (discussing case law holding that state
and federal constitutions' just-compensation provisions create cause of action in inverse
condemnation); Horry County v. Ins. Reserve Fund, 544 S.E.2d 637, 640 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001)
(stating that inverse-condemnation claim arises from constitution); Hurley v. State, 143 N.W.2d 722,
728-29 (S.D. 1966) (construing state constitution's just-compensation provision to create inverse-
condemnation remedy supplementing statutory remedies); Gen. Servs. Comm'n v. Little-Tex
Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 595-99 (Tex. 2001) (distinguishing breach-of-contract claim against
State, which is governed by statute, from just-compensation claim against State, which is governed
by case law construing state constitution's just-compensation provision); Timms v. State, 428 A.2d
1125, 1126 (Vt. 1981) (citing case law establishing that state constitution's just compensation clause
overrides sovereign immunity); Wyo. State Highway Dep't v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1347-51
(Wyo. 1978) (appearing to treat inverse-condemnation claim as arising from self-executing nature of
state constitution's just-compensation provision), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 948 (1978); cf Waid v.
Dep't of Transp., 996 P.2d 18, 24-25 (Wyo. 2000) (suggesting that Napolitano may have been
superseded by later statutes).
253. See, e.g., Dep't ofAgric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Fla. Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d 101, 103
n.2 (Fla. 1988) (holding that because of self-executing nature of state constitution's just-
compensation provision, no statutory authority was necessary for inverse-condemnation claim
against State); Fielder v. Rice Constr. Co., 522 S.E.2d 13, 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (reasoning that
sovereign immunity does not bar inverse-condemnation claims because inverse condemnation is
form of eminent domain; citing state constitution's just-compensation provision), cert. denied, No.
$99C1722, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 1020 (Ga. Nov. 19, 1999); Renninger v. State, 213 P.2d 911, 916
(Idaho 1950) (holding that Idaho Constitution both created cause of action in inverse condemnation
and waived sovereign immunity); Alexander, 381 P.2d at 781 (rejecting sovereign immunity defense
in light of self-executing nature of Montana Constitution's just-compensation provision); Hurley v.
State, 143 N.W.2d 722, 729 (S.D. 1966) (reasoning that no consent to sue State was necessary given
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light of decisions such as Larson),254 it is obvious now, in light of the
recent plurality opinion in Del Monte Dunes, and it provides a strong
justification for state courts to revisit the issue."' Second, some state-
court decisions holding that the State has waived its immunity appear to
rest on the belief that a State's immunity in its own courts exists solely as
a matter of state law. 6 Under this view, the "waiver" of state immunity
is not the result of any voluntary choice by the State but is instead the
result of preemption. This preemption analysis is incorrect after Alden v.
Maine, which makes clear that a state's immunity in its own courts is
protected by the U.S. Constitution. 7 With this error corrected, a state
court might still conclude that the State had waived its immunity as a
matter of state law. Even so, the incorrectness of the preemption analysis
self-executing nature of state constitution's just-compensation provision); Steele v. City of Houston,
603 S.W.2d 786,791 (Tex. 1980) (holding that state constitution's just-compensation provision both
waived sovereign immunity and created cause of action for just compensation); Smith v. Fenimore,
171 A.2d 228,231 (Vt. 1961) (holding that state constitution's just-compensation provision was self-
executing waiver of sovereign immunity that allowed common-law action for money); Wisconsin
Retired Teachers Ass'n v. Employee Trust Funds Bd., 558 N.W.2d 83, 94-95 (Wis. 1997) (holding
that just-compensation provision of Wisconsin Constitution was self-executing and therefore waived
state's sovereign immunity); see also James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign
Immunity: Federal Appellate Court Review of State-Court Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46
U.C.L.A. L RFv. 161, 207 n.168 (1998) [hereinafter Pfander, Intermediate Solution] ("In takings
cases, states often view just-compensation provisions in state constitutions as self-executing, thereby
overcoming the doctrine of sovereign immunity.").
254. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949)).
255. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (discussing City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 714 (1999)).
256. In New Jersey, for example, the courts appear to treat sovereign immunity as a creation of
state law. See Willis v. Dep't of Conservation & Econ. Dev., 264 A.3d 34, 35-38 (N.J. 1970). The
New Jersey Supreme Court recently concluded that state law cannot constrain suits in inverse
condemnation under First English. See Greenway Dev. Co. v. Borough of Paramus, 750 A.2d 764,
769-71 (N.J. 2000) (holding that suits in inverse condemnation were not subject to requirements of
state tort claims statute). Other states have come to a similar conclusion. See e.g., Jacoby v.
Arkansas, 962 S.W.2d 773, 775-78 (Ark. 1998) (holding that federal statute authorizing private
actions in state court overrode State's sovereign immunity under Arkansas Constitution), vacated,
527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Foss, 309 A.2d at 343-44 (holding that, while state legislature can authorize
state agency to commit trespass or create nuisance, that power is subject to just compensation
guarantee of federal constitution); Alper v. Clark County, 571 P.2d 810, 811-13 (Nev. 1977)
(holding that, because inverse-condemnation claim vindicated federal constitutional rights, claim
was not subject to state statutory restrictions on suits against counties).
257. See, eg., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (saying that state sovereign immunity
"inheres in the system of federalism established by the Constitution"); see also supra notes 207-210
(discussing Alden's elimination of preemption rationale for concluding that just-compensation
principle overrides sovereign-immunity principle).
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warrants reconsideration of the issue.258
In short, the issue addressed in this Article has direct relevance even
though many States have mitigated the harshness of sovereign immunity
by waiving their immunity to some extent.259 In many States, the waiver
is incomplete or unclear (or both). Moreover, although this Article
proposes an analysis specifically for evaluating just-compensation claims
against states, the analysis also has implications for other claims, as
discussed in the sections that follow.
B. State Remedial Obligations Under the Due Process Clause for
Deprivations Other than Takings of Private Property for Public
Use
The analysis proposed in Part IV would sometimes subject States to
just-compensation suits brought in their own courts, even though they
would be immune if those suits were brought in federal court. The
States' exposure to just-compensation suits, however, is not necessarily
the most significant feature of the proposed analysis. The proposed
analysis extends beyond claims based on the Just Compensation Clause,
because it does not rest solely on the Just Compensation Clause.26°
Rather, it rests on the interaction of that Clause and the procedural
component of the Due Process Clause. This Article proposes that the
remedial requirements of procedural due process can expose an
unconsenting State to suits in its own courts that would be barred by
sovereign immunity in federal court. That proposition includes, but is not
necessarily limited to, suits for just compensation, as this section
explains.
258. Cf GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, IX(f) (providing that waiver of sovereign immunity prescribed
in that provision should not be "construed as a waiver of any immunity provided.., by the United
States Constitution").
259. See Pfander, Intermediate Solution, supra note 253, at 207 n.168 (counting twenty-one
States that permit just-compensation claims in state tribunals). The availability of judicial relief in
most States for at least some just-compensation claims arguably supports the thesis of this Article
that the Due Process Clause requires such relief. Cf Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356, 360-
62 (1996) (examining modem precedent in analyzing due-process challenge to state rule of criminal
procedure).
260. Cf Beermann, supra note 18, at 315 (arguing that "[s]overeign and official immunities must
be overruled by the takings clause"); supra note 19 (citing commentary asserting, in light of First
English, that Just Compensation Clause, standing alone, overrides sovereign immunity).
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1. The Error-Remediation Element of Procedural Due Process
At the heart of this Article is the Court's repeated statement that both
the States and the federal government must make a "reasonable, certain
and adequate provision" for paying just compensation. 261 That statement
prescribes more than a substantive obligation to pay; it also demands the
existence of an adequate procedure for honoring that substantive
obligation.262  The Court has never identified the legal source of this
procedural requirement. In my view, it stems from the procedural
component of the Due Process Clause-i.e., from the doctrine of
procedural due process.
263
Procedural due process requires States to use adequate procedures
when they deprive people of life, liberty, or property.2" This is not just
procedure for procedure's sake.265  Rather, a key purpose of the
procedures is to ensure that these deprivations are accurate26 6-- i.e., that
261. E.g., Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194
(1985); see also supra notes 181-205 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that States
make "reasonable, certain, and adequate" provisions for paying just compensation).
262. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 717 (1999)
(stating that government can violate Constitution "by denying just compensation in fact or by
refusing to provide procedures through which compensation may be sought").
263. The Court has construed the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to do three
things.
First, [it] incorporates many of the specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights.... Second,
[it] contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.... [Third, it provides] a
guarantee of fair procedure.
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (internal quotations omitted). The third aspect is
elaborated in the doctrine of procedural due process. See id.
264. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The doctrine of procedural due process applies mainly to
government actions that directly cause "[a] relatively small number of persons" to be "exceptionally
affected, in each case upon individual grounds." Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915) (distinguishing case before it from Londoner v. City of Denver, 210
U.S. 373 (1908)); see generally BERNARD SCHWARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw §§ 5.6-5.8, at 232-37
(3d ed. 1991) (discussing LondonerBi-Metallic distinction).
265. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 803 (1996) ("the guarantee of due
process is not a mere form").
266. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 332 (1993) ("the quantum and quality of the process
due in a particular situation depend upon the need to serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of
error") (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979));
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) ("Procedural due process rules are meant to protect
persons ... from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property."); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) ("[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error
inherent in the truth-finding process .... ).
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they comport with both federal and state law.267 This accuracy goal
serves the systemic purpose of preserving the rule of law and the more
particularized purpose of protecting the substantive rights of individuals
in their life, liberty, and property.268
To achieve accuracy, procedures must not only avoid errors but also
provide a way to remedy the errors that inevitably occur.269 When an
error is detected before it causes a deprivation of life, liberty, or property,
the usual remedy is to prevent the deprivation from occurring, such as by
an injunction.27 ° When the error is detected after it has caused a
deprivation, some other remedy-including, in some situations, an award
of compensatory damages-may be required to fulfill the accuracy goal
of the Due Process Clause.27' In short, the doctrine of procedural due
process contemplates that procedures will serve two functions: error-
267. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) (holding that
procedural due process entitled municipal employee to pre-termination procedures to ensure that
termination was based on accurate facts and was otherwise appropriate); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 581 (1975) (holding that Due Process Clause entitled public school student to "rudimentary"
procedures before being suspended from school to prevent suspensions based on "unfair or mistaken
findings of misconduct"); Daniel S. Feder, Note, From Parratt to Zinermon: Authorization,
Adequacy, and Immunity In a Systemic Analysis of State Procedure, II CARDOZO L. REv. 831, 844-
45 (1990) (identifying accuracy as main goal of procedural due process, including accuracy in the
"faithful implementation of state substantive laws").
268. Cf Fallon, Confusions, supra note 190, at 311 ("The ultimate commitment of the law of due
process remedies-analogous to that of procedural due process-is to create schemes and incentives
adequate to keep government, overall and on average, tolerably within the bounds of law."); id. at
338 (stating that "the Constitution in general and the Due Process Clause in particular do sometimes
require individually effective remediation for constitutional violations").
269. See. e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990) (stating that inquiry under doctrine
of procedural due process "would examine the procedural safeguards built into the statutory or
administrative procedure of effecting the deprivation, and any remedies for erroneous deprivations
provided by statute or tort law").
270. See Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211,221-28 (1908) (holding that Court had jurisdiction
to review state supreme court decision dismissing, on sovereign immunity grounds, suit against state
officer challenging constitutionality of state tax law); Seamon, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 104,
at 344-45, 381-83, 397-98 (discussing Crain and ultimately proposing that it be understood as a
decision resting on Due Process Clause); see also Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461, 469-
71 (1932) (holding that, to avoid due-process concerns, state statute should be construed to let state
courts enjoin state administrative order revoking plaintiff's permit to do business in State).
271. See. e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 39
(1990) (holding that, when State chooses to remit taxpayers to post-collection relief from erroneous
taxation, due process requires state to "provide taxpayers with, not only a fair opportunity to
challenge the accuracy and legal validity of their tax obligation, but also a clear and certain remedy
for any erroneous or unlawful tax collection") (internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote
omitted); cf Booth v. Chumer, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1823-24 (2001) ("[D]epending on where one looks,
'remedy' can mean either specific relief obtainable at the end of a process of seeking redress, or the
process itself.").
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avoidance and error-remediation.272
As between error-avoidance and error-remediation, the error-
avoidance function is probably better known, perhaps because it was
emphasized in the well-known decision Mathews v. Eldridge.273 In
Mathews, the Court said that its precedent considered three factors in
evaluating the adequacy of a procedure that deprived someone of life,
liberty, or property:
[fjirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.274
In describing the second factor, the Court seemed primarily concerned
with minimizing the risk of error-i.e., in error-avoidance. Given that
concern, the three-factor inquiry as a whole seems to stress enhanced
error-avoidance as the relevant goal of additional procedural safeguards
(while also making clear that, even if additional procedural safeguards
would minimize errors, they may not be constitutionally required in light
of the relevant individual and governmental interests).
One of the best-known cases addressing the error-remediation (as
distinguished from the error-avoidance) function of procedural due
process is Parratt v. Taylor.275 In Parratt, the Court held that the
requirements of procedural due process were satisfied by a state tort
remedy for a prison official's allegedly negligent loss of a prisoner's
property (a hobby kit).276 That holding emphasized not only a tort
action's potential for determining whether the deprivation was erroneous
272. Professor Fallon has argued that the post-deprivation remedial demands of the Due Process
Clause should be considered distinct from the pre-deprivation procedures traditionally associated
with "procedural due process." See Fallon, Confusions, supra note 190, at 329-40. Without
disagreeing with that argument, this Article discusses the remedial demands of the Due Process
Clause as an aspect of procedural due process, in keeping with the Court's current approach. See,
e.g., Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126 (stating that inquiry under doctrine of procedural due process
"vould examine.., any remedies for erroneous deprivations"); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537
(1981) ("[W]e must decide whether the tort remedies which the State of Nebraska provides as a
means of redress for property deprivations satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.")
(emphasis added).
273. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also supra note 266 (citing precedent that describes accuracy goal
ofprocedural due process in terms of minimizing error).
274. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
275. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
276. Id. at 536-44.
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but also its potential for remedying an erroneous deprivation.2 77 In later
cases, the Court confirmed that procedural due-process analysis
examines not only the "procedural safeguards" against erroneous
deprivations but also "any remedies for erroneous deprivations provided
by statute or tort law. ' 78
This Article relies principally on the error-remediation element of
procedural due process. Of course, procedural due process requires a
State to have an adequate process for accurately identifying instances in
which it has taken private property for public use (this is an important
requirement, considering how hard it can be accurately to identify
regulatory takings). It is the error-remediation element of procedural due
process, however, that sometimes overrides sovereign immunity by
requiring state courts to award just compensation payable from the state
treasury if there is no adequate, alternative compensation scheme. In
short, a State meets its procedural due process obligations only when,
having identified an instance in which private property has been taken
for public use, it also provides the remedy-i.e., payment of just
compensation-that is necessary to prevent that taking from being
unconstitutional (and hence erroneous).
Because of this Article's reliance on the error-remediation element of
the doctrine of procedural due process, I must address commentary that
denies the validity of that element. In particular, Professors Wells and
Eaton have argued that the Court was wrong, and departed from
precedent, when in Parratt and later cases it construed the doctrine of
procedural due process sometimes to require States to provide post-
277. See id. at 543-44 (observing that post-deprivation tort action provided a "means by which
[the plaintiff] can receive redress for the deprivation" and be "fully compensated ... for the property
loss").
278. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126; see id. at 125 ("the existence of state remedies is relevant" to
procedural due-process analysis) (emphasis in original); id. at 129 (stating that, in Mathews, "it was
clear that the State, by making available a tort remedy that could adequately redress the loss, had
given the prisoner the process he was due"); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999) (citing Parratt for proposition that State can satisfy
procedural due process requirement by providing post-deprivation remedy); Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 285 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that "Parratt rule" stems from
procedural due process and would be satisfied in that case by availability of post-deprivation state
tort suit for malicious prosecution); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985) (relying on Parratt to hold that violation of Just Compensation Clause was
not complete until state denied just compensation); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)
(relying on Parratt to "hold that an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state
employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available");
Logan, 455 U.S. at 435-37 (holding that State violated procedural due process in that case;
distinguishing Parratt, while clearly treating it as valid procedural due process precedent).
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deprivation remedies for erroneous deprivations; in their view, any
requirement of a post-deprivation remedy must stem, if anywhere, from
the doctrine of substantive due process. 79 If they are right, the analysis
proposed in this Article may be wrong, because the doctrine of
substantive due process would be an odd basis for overriding a State's
sovereign immunity from just-compensation claims. When a court
concludes that government action violates substantive due process, that
conclusion ordinarily requires invalidation of the action.280 In contrast,
when a court concludes that government action constitutes a taking of
private property for public use, that conclusion does not invalidate the
government action; it means only that the government must pay for the
property that has been taken.28" ' Thus, the doctrine of substantive due
process and the doctrine of just compensation work somewhat at cross-
purposes.
282
In any event, I respectfully disagree with Professors Wells' and
Eaton's view that Parratt and its progeny erroneously depart from
procedural due process precedent.283 Precedent amply supports the
Court's conclusion in Parratt and later cases that procedural due process
can require a state to provide post-deprivation remedies for erroneous
deprivations.284  Support for the Court's procedural due-process analysis
279. See Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of
Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REv. 201,212-22 (1984).
280. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) ("[T]he due process clause contains a
substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
281. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 314-15 (1987) (stating that Just Compensation Clause "does not prohibit the taking of private
property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power," and that Clause "is designed
not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure
compensation").
282. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 197 (stating that remedy for successful substantive due
process challenge to government regulation "is not 'just compensation,' but invalidation of the
regulation and if authorized and appropriate, actual damages"); see also John D. Echeverria, Takings
and Errors, 51 ALA. L REV. 1047, 1048 (2000) (arguing that compensable taking cannot be caused
by government conduct that constitutes "any type of illegality," including constitutional violations).
But cf. Richard H. Seamon, An Analysis ofJurisdictional Issues Arising From Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1239, 1256-58 (2000) (arguing that unconstitutional government conduct
can cause a taking).
283. See also Feder, supra note 267, at 840 (observing that "courts and commentators consistently
refuse to accept the Supreme Court's own characterization" of its decision in Parratt as resting on
procedural due process but defending Court's characterization).
284. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981); see also supra note 278 (citing later
cases in which Court described "Parratt rule" as making existence of state post-deprivation remedies
relevant to procedural due-process analysis).
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comes from: (1) Ingraham v. Wright,85 in which the Court held that
procedural due process was satisfied by the availability of a state tort
remedy against public school teachers who wrongfully imposed corporal
punishment on their students; 286 (2) a line of cases the most famous of
which is North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago,287 in
which the Court rejected procedural due process challenges to
government deprivations that justifiably, in light of some exigency,
occurred without meaningful pre-deprivation procedures but afforded
post-deprivation remedies;2 8  and (3) the line of cases exemplified by
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 289 in
which the Court construed the doctrine of procedural due process to
require States to provide either a pre-deprivation or post-deprivation
remedy for erroneously collected taxes.90
Professors Wells and Eaton find Ingraham and the North American
Cold Storage line of cases inapposite because they involved government
deprivations that under some circumstances would be justified.29' For
example, Ingraham involved corporal punishment of public school
students, which "may help maintain order in the classroom"; 292 North
American Cold Storage involved the government's summary
quarantining of food that officials suspected (perhaps erroneously) was
unwholesome. 93 Both cases thus presumed that the challenged
government conduct could be justified under certain circumstances-i.e.,
if the beaten child was misbehaving and the confiscated food was
unwholesome. Parratt, in contrast, involved the allegedly negligent loss
of the plaintiffs property by a government official, conduct that, the
plaintiff claimed, could never be justified.9
But just as the government can (according to the Court) properly beat
a child who is believed to have misbehaved and confiscate food that is
285 430 U S. 651 (1977).
286. Id. at 682.
287. 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
288. Id. at 314-19.
289. 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
290. Id. at 31-51; see also supra notes 217-26 and accompanying text (discussing McKesson line
of cases) and infra notes 295-97 (same).
291. Wells & Eaton, supra note 279, at 219-21.
292. Wells & Eaton, supra note 279, at 219.
293. Wells & Eaton, supra note 279, at 220 & n.85.
294. Wells & Eaton, supra note 279, at 220-21; see also Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts,
Connon Law Torts, and Due Process of Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 617, 625-26 (1997)
(describing Parratt as "a failure").
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believed to be contaminated, it can properly destroy a prisoner's property
if, for example, the property is believed to be contraband. Those beliefs
may turn out to be erroneous, and for that reason, the Court in cases
involving these actions, including Parratt, construed procedural due
process to require post-deprivation remedies. Parratt is not
distinguishable from Ingraham and North American Cold Storage,
however, merely because a prison official's destruction of a prisoner's
property would violate substantive due process if motivated by sheer
malice. So too, the malicious beating of a school student who was not
believed to be misbehaving, and the malicious destruction of food that
was not believed to be contaminated, would violate substantive due
process. All this means is that, depending on the justification (or lack
thereof) for governmental deprivation of liberty or property, the victim of
the deprivation may be able to assert a substantive due process claim or
only a procedural due process claim. But the issue of justification does
not distinguish Ingraham and North American Cold Storage from
Parratt.
Professor Wells finds the McKesson line of cases inapposite because,
in light of the federal Tax Injunction Act,295 those cases concern a state-
court remedy that "may be the only recourse for unconstitutionally
collected taxes., 296 The problem with this basis for distinguishing the
Court's reliance on procedural due process in the McKesson line of cases
from its reliance on procedural due process in Parratt and its progeny is
that the Court itself in the McKesson line of cases did not rely on the
unavailability of federal-court remedies in concluding that due process
mandated a state-court remedy for erroneous taxes. More fundamentally,
as argued above, the availability of a federal-court remedy does not
excuse a State's failure to provide its own remedies to the extent required
by the Due Process Clause."
In sum, the Court has held that procedural due process requires
295. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) ("The [federal] district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain
the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State.").
296. Michael Wells, Suing States, supra note 18, at 778 ("The constitutionally-implied [sic]
remedy issue arises in the tax context and not elsewhere because other remedies, including § 1983
suits, are typically available for other constitutional violations, while a state court [tax] refund
action, implied directly from the Due Process Clause, may be the only recourse for
unconstitutionally collected taxes."); see also id. at 793 ("But an equally essential premise for the
state court cause of action recognized in Reich [a decision following McKesson] is that Congress
may validly bar taxpayer access to the federal courts, as it has by the tax injunction act."); id. at 800
(describing principle established in Reich to be that "states must provide effective remedies for
constitutional violations when federal remedies are not available").
297. See supra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
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procedures that not only avoid but also remedy erroneous deprivations of
life, liberty or property. This Article contends that the remedial element
of procedural due process underlies a State's obligation to create a
procedural scheme for awarding just compensation when it takes private
property for public use. If a State does not create an adequate alternative
to just-compensation suits against itself in its own courts, it cannot rely
on sovereign immunity to defeat those suits.
2. The Interaction of the Remedial Element of Procedural Due
Process and the Just Compensation Clause
Although procedural due process requires error-remediation, it does
not require a remedy for every error, nor does it require the same type of
remedy for every type of error.298 This Article has focused on
deprivations that consist of governmental takings of private property for
public use. Such a deprivation is erroneous only when it occurs without
the payment of just compensation. Once that error (the failure to pay just
compensation) is identified, the nature and invariability of the remedy-
the payment of just compensation for every such taking-is dictated by
the text of the Just Compensation Clause. 299 Thus, it is procedural due
process that requires some remedy, but it is the Just Compensation
Clause that specifies what the remedy must be in every instance.
The Court has held that the procedural component of the Due Process
Clause also requires a compensatory remedy-but does not invariably do
so-for the erroneous collection of taxes."' The collection of taxes
implicates procedural due process because it deprives taxpayers of their
property (namely, their money). °' Procedural due process accordingly
requires the State to have adequate procedures to ensure that the taxes are
collected accurately-i.e., consistently with state and federal law. This
298. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.9 (1980) ("It must be remembered that
even if a state decision does deprive an individual of life or property, and even if that decision is
erroneous, it does not necessarily follow that the decision violated that individual's right to due
process.").
299. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316
(1987) ("in the event of a taking, the compensation remedy is required by the Constitution"); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658 n.24 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[T]his is not a case involving implication of a damages remedy-the words of the Just
Compensation Clause are express.").
300. See supra notes 217-32 and accompanying text (arguing that Court's tax cases support
conclusion that Due Process Clause can override States' sovereign immunity from just-
compensation claims).
301. See McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages &Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 51 (1990).
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requirement includes the need for procedures that prospectively prevent
or retroactively remedy erroneous collections. As to the timing of those
procedures, "the States may determine whether to provide predeprivation
process (e.g., an injunction) or instead to afford post deprivation relief
(e.g., a refund)."30 2 When a State chooses to provide post-deprivation
relief, instead of pre-deprivation relief, for erroneous taxes, a refund is
not invariably required. For example, if a state tax violates the
Commerce Clause by discriminating between out-of-state taxpayers and
their in-state competitors, the State might be able to satisfy the Due
Process Clause by retroactively increasing the taxes of the in-state
competitors.3 3 In contrast, procedural due process would require a
refund of state taxes that were erroneously collected from people who
were exempt from the taxes under a federal statute.3 Thus, the remedial
requirements imposed by the doctrine of procedural due process, like
other requirements imposed by that doctrine, depend partly on the nature
of the individual harm caused by an erroneous deprivation.
311
For this reason, the Due Process Clause might sometimes require a
State to refund taxes that had been collected in violation of state, rather
than federal, law. 3 6 The nature of a taxpayer's harm does not vary
depending on whether the State has erroneously collected taxes from him
in violation of (say) a state-law exemption or a federal-law exemption.
Of course, there may be considerations besides individual harm that
would justify construing the Due Process Clause to require differing
remedies for federal-law and state-law violations, including the role of
those remedies in ensuring the supremacy of federal law.30 7 The point is
302. Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582,587 (1995).
303. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 39-40.
304. See Ward v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 22-25 (1920); see also McKesson, 496
U.S. at 39 (citing Ward as example of situation in which State "would have had no choice" but to
refund taxes).
305. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759-61 (1982) (holding that burden of proof
required in proceeding to terminate parental rights depended partly on nature of individual interest
affected by erroneous termination).
306. Cf. Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies,
107 YALE IU. 77, 83-84, 133 (1997) (arguing that early Supreme Court case law suggests that
"remedies for some state law violations may be constitutionally required").
307. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 105 (stating that due process "requires a clear and certain remedy
for taxes collected in violation of federal law") (emphasis added); cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 114 (1984) (stating that Court's development of Ex parte Young doctrine
bad reflected "accommodat[ion]" between "the need to promote the supremacy of federal law" and
"the constitutional immunity of the States," and holding that doctrine does not authorize federal-
court relief for violations of state law); Jackson, The Supreme Court, supra note 18, at 52-61
(arguing that federal courts should be more willing to grant relief for States' violations of federal law
than for their violations of state law); Woolhandler, Old Property, supra note 225, at 937
1131
Washington Law Review Vol. 76:1067, 2001
that, if a state court decided that a state tax had been collected from a
taxpayer in violation of state law, but denied a refund as barred by
sovereign immunity, the taxpayer could plausibly argue that the state
court's decision violated the doctrine of procedural due process, and the
argument would pose a question about the remedial requirements of that
doctrine."'
The Court's tax cases show that the remedial requirement of
procedural due process can override state sovereign immunity, but the
cases should not be read to mean that the remedial requirement always
does. Although the doctrine of procedural due process requires States to
create a system for avoiding and remedying erroneous deprivations of
life, liberty, and property-the doctrine does not require the system to
detect all errors, 09 to remedy all errors detected,3"' or to make the post-
deprivation remedy required for an erroneous deprivation a judicial
award of money from the sovereign's treasury.3 ' That is because the
("[S]upremacy concerns suggest that injunctive relief must be available to ensure state compliance
with valid federal statutory law, quite apart from whether due process of its own force requires such
remedies.").
308. See Cent. of Ga. Ry. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127, 136-42 (1907) (holding that Due Process
Clause was violated by state laws that authorized state taxes to be assessed against taxpayer without
giving taxpayer a chance to challenge official's valuation of taxable property).
309. See, e.g., Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 (1985) (due
process "does not require that the procedures used to guard against an erroneous deprivation ... be
so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of error") (internal quotation marks omitted).
310. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.9 (1980) ("It must be remembered that
even if a state decision does deprive an individual of life or property, and even if that decision is
erroneous, it does not necessarily follow that the decision violated that individual's right to due
process."); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (holding that due process did not require
hearing before suspension of drivers' license, while recognizing that post-suspension detection of
error would not yield a complete remedy); Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 & n.8
(1978) (indicating that state medical school's decision did not violate due process even if it violated
school's own rules); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 694 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)
(observing that, under majority's holding, public school student who suffered corporal punishment
on basis of mistaken facts would have no remedy as long as officials acted reasonably); Fallon,
Confusions, supra note 190, at 311:
The dictum of Marbury v. Madison notwithstanding, there is no right to an individually
effective remedy for every constitutional violation. The ultimate commitment of the law of due
process remedies-analogous to that of procedural due process-is to create schemes and
incentives adequate to keep government, overall and on average, tolerably within the bounds of
law.
311. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929-36 (1997) (holding that State did not violate
doctrine of procedural due process by suspending plaintiff without pay, even though this entailed
loss of income during period of suspension); see also Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S.
496, 529 (1939) ("There are many rights and immunities secured by the Constitution ... which are
not capable of money valuation .... "); Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: 77e
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doctrine's demand for error-avoidance and error-remediation vary
depending on the individual and governmental interests at stake.312 For
example, the Due Process Clause may demand greater accuracy for
permanent deprivations of property than for temporary ones.
3 13
Furthermore, the invariability with which a remedy is required for an
erroneous deprivation may depend not only on the nature of the
individual harm caused by an erroneous deprivation but also on other
factors, such as whether or not the error is one of federal law; if an error
is one of federal law, whether it is a statutory error or a constitutional
one; and, if the error is constitutional, what type of constitutional right is
affected.1
An illustrative case is Ingraham v. Wright,315 in which the Court held
that due process does not require procedural safeguards before a public
school official beats a student.316 (Corporal punishment implicates
procedural due process because it interferes with the student's liberty
interest in being free from physical restraint and pain.)317 The Ingraham
Court held that due process was satisfied by the availability of a post-
punishment state tort suit against the responsible officials."' Obviously,
these tort suits would not detect every erroneous beating. Moreover, as
the dissent observed, tort suits would not ensure a remedy for every
Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L REv. 1532, 1544 (1972) (asserting that, contrary to
implication in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395, the federal courts' "exercise of remedial power to create a
damage action directly from the Constitution [was) virtually unprecedented"); John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 279 (2000) ("The strictures in the
Constitution were not conceived as predicates for money damages.").
312. See, for example, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976), where the Court described
precedent on procedural due process to require consideration of:
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
313. See, e.g., Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 932 (stating that procedural due-process analysis considers
finality of deprivation); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340 (determining that individual interest at stake in
that case was in uninterrupted flow of benefits, rather than in absolute amount of benefits, because, if
termination found erroneous, benefits would be awarded retroactively).
314. Cf. Jeffries, supra note 311, at 280 (arguing that "the [official] liability rule for money
damages should vary with the constitutional violation at issue").
315. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
316. Id. at 683.
317. See id. at 673-74.
318. Id. at 683 (concluding that due process was satisfied by state's "preservation of common-law
constraints and remedies").
1133
Washington Law Review
beating that was found, in those suits, to have been erroneous.3 tO
As with erroneous tax collections, the need for a compensatory remedy
for an erroneous liberty deprivation may depend on whether the error is
one of state law or federal law.32' For example, compensation may not
be constitutionally required for the beating of a student that was
erroneous because it violated a state statute. 2 In contrast, compensation
may be required if the beating violated substantive due process because
of its arbitrariness.322 The differing results would reflect that the
remedial demands of the Due Process Clause can be influenced by the
Supremacy Clause.323
In short, the remedial element of procedural due process produces
some hard cases, but cases involving governmental takings of private
property for public use are not among them. It is difficult to explain, for
example, the case law indicating that compensation from the State is
often required for erroneous taxation but seldom for erroneous liberty
deprivations. 24 In contrast, there is an explanation for the nature and
invariability of the remedy required for governmental takings of private
property for public use: Although the Due Process Clause requires a
remedy for that sort of deprivation, the nature and invariability of that
remedy (just compensation for every such taking) is prescribed by the
Just Compensation Clause. The Constitution does not prescribe the
319. Id. at 693-94 & n.l I (White, J., dissenting).
320. See supra notes 306-08 and accompanying text.
321. Cf Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment should not
be interpreted as a "font of tort law").
322. Cf County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-51 (1998) (explaining that doctrine
of substantive due process does not invariably create constitutional liability for official conduct that
would constitute a tort).
323. The Supremacy Clause can likewise influence whether a State's remedial procedures must
include judicial review. See supra note 190 (observing that, even if Due Process Clause would not,
standing alone, require state to involve its courts in adjudicating just-compensation claims,
Supremacy Clause may mandate judicial review in some circumstances).
324. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 18, at 1825-28 (discussing possible reasons for differences
between Court's decisions in tax cases and its decisions in other due process cases and finding none
of them satisfactory). It is likewise difficult for this author to understand the Court's conclusion that
a government official's negligence can never constitute a "depriv[ation]" within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) ("[T]he protections of the
Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by
prison officials "); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-36 (1986) (holding that Due
Process Clause is not implicated by a state official's negligent destruction of property because such
conduct does not "deprive" a person of the property, within the meaning of the Due Process Clause).
In my view, if the negligence is caused by inadequate procedures (for example, the procedures for
training or supervising the negligent official), the Court should recognize a deprivation.
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remedies required for other erroneous deprivations of life, liberty, or
property. In the absence of textual guidance, difficult questions arise." 5
3. Summary: The Just Compensation Clause Plus Procedural Due
Process Can Override Sovereign Immunity
This section has not essayed a grand theory of due process remedies or
even suggested that such a theory is appropriate.326 Rather, it has
discussed the implications of Part IV's reliance on the doctrine of
procedural due process, plus the Just Compensation Clause, as the legal
bases for overriding state sovereign immunity from just-compensation
claims. The discussion has emphasized that procedural due process
obligates States to have procedures designed not only to avoid but to
remedy erroneous deprivations of life, liberty, or property. There is no
single answer to the question of what remedy the Due Process Clause
325. Although the Just Compensation Clause has been interpreted to require compensation for
every taking of private property for public use, this interpretation does not necessarily give the right
to just compensation privileged status among constitutional rights. This becomes clear when one
considers that injunctive relief is not available to prevent the government from taking private
property for public use. See Seamon, Separation of Powers, supra note 59, at 210-11. In contrast,
injunctive relief is often available to protect other constitutional rights, such as those secured by the
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 36 (2000) (upholding
preliminary injunction against drug checkpoint program found to violate Fourth Amendment). By
the same token, the government could not force someone to submit to an unreasonable search and
seizure by tendering just compensation. Cf Brauneis, supra note 20, at 61 (observing that 19th
century case law invalidated laws that authorized uncompensated takings, treating them similarly to
warrants issued without probable cause, in violation of Fourth Amendment); Dellinger, supra note
311, at 1562-63 (arguing that protection of Fourth Amendment would be weakened if exclusionary
rule were abolished in favor of requiring government compensation for Fourth Amendment
violations). In this respect, as Professor Brauneis has observed, just-compensation rights are
"uniquely weak"; they provide only liability-rule protection instead of the stronger property-rule
protection provided by other constitutional rights. See E-Mail from Robert Brauneis, Associate
Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School, to Richard H. Seamon, Assistant
Professor of Law, Univ. of S.C. (Jan. 24, 2001) (on file with author); see also Brauneis, supra note
20, at 113 (observing that, in contrast to governmental takings, which trigger Just Compensation
Clause's provision for monetary relief, violations of other constitutional provisions that flatly and
unqualifiedly limit government power "should arguably be seen as more serious than the mere
failure to pay compensation for what could be forcibly taken so long as it was paid for"); Robert
Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings'Jurisprudence": The Myth and Meaning of
Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 672 n.268 (1996)
(discussing distinction between a "liability rule" and "property rule" in context of takings
jurisprudence); Jackson, The Supreme Court, supra note 18, at 93 (observing that, because monetary
awards for govemment's violation of certain rights could be perceived as "depreciat[ing] the value
of those rights," injunctive relief is preferable for such violations).
326. Cf Jeffries, supra note 311, at 259 (arguing that it is not appropriate to determine the
availability of money damages from state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without considering the
nature of the constitutional violation for which the damages are sought).
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327
requires for a State's erroneous deprivation of life, liberty, or property.
The Court's decisions make clear, however, that for some deprivations-
including, but not limited to, those involving takings of private property
for public use-the Clause requires compensation. This Article argues
that, when that is the remedy required by the Fourteenth Amendment,
and when it is sought in a state court of otherwise competent jurisdiction,
a state court cannot deny the remedy because of sovereign immunity if
the State has created no adequate alternative for providing just
compensation. This is true even though that judicial remedy would be
barred by the State's sovereign immunity if it were sought in a federal
court. Thus, the Due Process Clause creates asymmetries between a
State's immunity in its own courts and its immunity in federal court. 8
C. The United States' Obligations Under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment
Just as the analysis offered here is not limited to claims for just
compensation, it is not limited to claims against the States. The United
States has remedial obligations under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 9 Under that Clause, when the federal government takes
private property for public use, it, like the States, must have made
"reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining
compensation. 33°  Currently, the federal government meets this
obligation by authorizing just compensation suits to be brought against it
327. Cf Hart, supra note 244, at 1366-67 (discussing breadth of congressional discretion to
prescribe remedies consistent with Constitution).
328. 1 thus join Professor Jackson, and part company with Professor Vdzquez, in believing that a
State cannot always satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment by letting its officers be sued. See Vicki C.
Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 953, 979 n.91 (2000) (stating that she is "not
yet persuaded by the argument that the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment could always be
satisfied with relief against officers"); cf Vizquez, What Is, supra note 18, at 1770 (proposing
reinterpretation of McKesson "as establishing that individuals injured by a state's violation of
mandatory federal obligations have a right to damages not from the state itself, but from state
officials"); Vdzquez, Alden Trilogy, supra note 18, at 1947-48 (asserting that Court's due process
precedent "could be reconciled, and other doctrinal conundrums solved, if McKesson were
interpreted as holding that the remedy required by the Due Process Clause is a remedy against state
officials rather than the state itself").
329. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
330. See supra note 181 (citing cases articulating the "reasonable, certain, and adequate"
standard, many of which involved asserted takings by federal government).
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under the Tucker Act. 3  As discussed above, some early decisions of the
Court-including Schillinger and Lynch-have been read to suggest that,
in the absence of the Tucker Act, the United States would have sovereign
immunity from just-compensation suits. 3 2  As also discussed above,
however, the Schillinger line of cases has been undermined by later
precedent, and Lynch is better read as prohibiting, rather than
authorizing, the United States to use sovereign immunity to prevent
payment of just compensation. Under the analysis proposed here, the
Due Process Clause would bar Congress from repealing the Tucker Act
unless there were an adequate, alternative procedure by which the federal
government would pay just compensation for private property that it took
for public use.
The Court hinted as much in Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United
States. 333 In that case, a federal agency appropriated two shipbuilding
contracts, as well as the completed ships, from a Russian corporation.3
The federal statute authorizing the appropriation also authorized people
whose property had been appropriated to sue the United States for just
compensation.335 The Court rejected the government's argument that the
provision authorizing these suits did not permit suits to be brought by
companies incorporated in a country the government of which was not
recognized by the United States. 336  The Court determined that the
government's interpretation, "to say the least, would raise a grave
question as to the constitutional validity of the act."337  That
determination implies that the Constitution requires the United States to
have an adequate scheme for paying just compensation when it takes
private property for public use.3
31
The same implication arises from the Court's decisions on the
331. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (1994); see also Reg'l Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 149
(1974) (holding that availability of Tucker Act remedy for taking alleged in that case ensured that
"procedural due process is satisfied"). Claims for just compensation of $10,000 or less may be
brought in either the Court of Claims or the federal district courts, under the "Little Tucker Act." See
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).
332. See supra notes 115-139 and accompanying text (Part III.C).
333. 282 U.S. 481 (1931).
334. Id. at 486-87 (explaining that contracts were appropriated by United States Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corp. under federal statute and executive order).
335. Id. at 489-90 (describing relevant provisions of Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 29, 40 Stat. 183).
336. Id. at 492.
337. Id., quoted in Developments in the Law, supra note 125 at 878 n.338.
338. See also Reg'l Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974) (stating that there would
"clearly [be] grave doubts" about constitutionality of federal statute at issue in that case if statute
were construed to withdraw Tucker Act remedy for governmental taking of plaintiffs' property).
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authority of federal district courts to address just-compensation claims
against the federal government. The Court has held that the district courts
cannot exercise federal-question jurisdiction over just-compensation
claims that can be asserted in the United States Court of Federal Claims
under the Tucker Act . 39 The Court has also indicated, however, that a
district court can exercise federal-question jurisdiction over a just-
compensation claim if Congress has withdrawn the Tucker Act remedy
for that claim.34° The Court has never suggested that the federal
government's sovereign immunity bars the district courts from hearing
just-compensation claims that cannot be asserted under the Tucker Act.34
To the contrary, the Court's decisions suggest that the federal district
courts act as a backstop for the Court of Claims by resolving just-
compensation claims that do not fall within the latter's jurisdiction under
the Tucker Act.
3 42
339. See, e.g., Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 11-17 (1990); Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 94 n.39 (1978); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U S.
646, 647-48 & n.8 (1962). But cf Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 196, at 43-50 (discussing some
inconsistencies in relevant precedent).
340. See E. Enters., Inc. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 520-22 (1998) (plurality opinion) (holding that
takings claim was properly addressed by federal district court because Tucker Act remedy had
presumptively been withdrawn for plaintiffs claim); Reg'l Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 124-
25, 138 (holding that takings claim was ripe given uncertainty about availability of Tucker Act
remedy)
341. Much is unclear about the sovereign immunity of the United States, including whether it,
like state sovereign immunity, is of constitutional stature. See FALLON, supra note 19, at 1001-02.
Quite apart from the United States' sovereign immunity, another potential restriction on judicial
awards of money payable from the U.S. Treasury stems from the Appropriations Clause, which
prohibits payments from the Treasury except "in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see also supra note 241 (discussing state constitutional provisions
requiring that payments from state treasury occur only pursuant to appropriation statute). Under
current federal law, however, that constitutional restraint on payments from the federal treasury is
more theoretical than real, as a practical matter. Many money judgments entered by the federal
courts can be paid out of the U.S. Treasury under the Judgment Fund Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994).
The Act appears to authorize the federal district courts to enter awards ofjust compensation against
the United States. See id. § 1304(a)(3)(A) (authorizing appropriation of "necessary amounts" for
payment of judgments entered under 28 U.S.C. § 2414); 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (authorizing payment of
"final judgments rendered by a district court... against the United States"); Republic Nat'l Bank of
Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 95 (1992) (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court). A
separate federal statute authorizes the U.S. Court of Claims to enter money judgments against the
United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2517. See generally Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S.
414, 424-34 (1990) (discussing relationship between Appropriations Clause and statutory
authorization for disbursements from treasury under, among other statutes, the Judgment Fund Act).
342. See Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 196, at 43-44 (discussing power of federal district courts
to decide whether Tucker Act remedy is available for alleged takings by federal government). For
the reasons discussed in analyzing just-compensation claims against the States, an adequate remedy
forjust-compensation claims against the United States cannot always be furnished through an officer
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In short, just as the state courts enable the States to provide due
process, so too do the United States Court of Federal Claims and the
United States District Courts enable the federal government to provide
due process. And, just as the Due Process Clause would prevent state
courts from honoring a defense of sovereign immunity when doing so
would deny just compensation, so would the Clause prevent the federal
courts from doing so.343
D. Congress's Power Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to
suit. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text. In a suit against a federal officer, a court
usually could enjoin the officer from continuing to take the plaintiff's property, as United States v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), shows. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. But cf. Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.1 1(1949) (noting that injunctive relief
in suit against federal officer would be barred "if the relief requested can not be granted by merely
ordering the cessation of the conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by the
sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property"). Moreover, the court could
award damages against the officer for the temporary taking, as the Belknap case shows. Belknap v.
Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896); see also supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text. The problem is that
the damages often would either be barred by official immunity or unrecoverable as a practical
matter.
343. As discussed in Part II.C above, supra notes 115-39 and accompanying text, there is early
Court case law suggesting that the United States would be immune from just-compensation claims in
the absence of a statutory waiver such as the Tucker Act. It is possible that, contrary to the
conclusion for which this Section of the Article contends, the Court could rely on that early case law
to hold that the United States is immune from just-compensation claims while also concluding that
the Fourteenth Amendment overrides the States' sovereign immunity from such claims. This
differing treatment of the United States and the States could be defended on at least three grounds:
(1) that the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, was not meant to alter the
sovereign immunity that existed under the original Constitution, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996) (stating that Congress's power under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment to
abrogate state sovereign immunity rested on the rationale that "the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted
well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated
to alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the
Eleventh Amendment"); (2) that the separation-of-powers doctrine puts a limit on federal courts'
power to enter money judgments against members of the federal political branches, cf. Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 477 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (stating that federal courts' reliance
on executive branch for enforcement of its judgments "place[s] the case of a State, and the case of
the United States, in very different points of view" when it came to sovereign immunity); or (3) that
the Framers intended in the original Constitution to distinguish the suability of the States from the
suability of the United States, see James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory"
Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1370-73 (1998) (discussing
historical basis for differential treatment of federal and state sovereign immunity). I thank Professors
Joshua Schwartz and Robert Brauneis for the insight that the United States' immunity from just-
compensation claims could, consistently with case law, be found to differ from that of the States. See
Posting of Environmental Policy Project, (Dec. 17, 1999) (forwarding comments of Joshua I.
Schwartz, Professor of Law, The George Washington Univ. Law School, and Robert Brauneis,
Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington Univ. Law School) (copy on file with author).
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"enforce" the Due Process Clause by "appropriate legislation. 344
Congress's Section 5 power has been addressed in several recentdecisions of the Court. 3 45 This Part does not attempt a comprehensive
analysis of those decisions. Instead, this Part describes two ways in
which the due-process analysis proposed in this Article sheds light on
Congress's Section 5 power. First, the proposed analysis clarifies that the
States' obligation to remedy erroneous deprivations of life, liberty, or
property stems from the procedural component of the Due Process
Clause.346  Congress can use Section 5 enforce those remedial
obligations, but it is not necessarily "appropriate" for Congress to do so
by regulating the state conduct that merely gives rise to those
obligations.347 Second, the proposed analysis clarifies that federal courts
cannot help the States meet their remedial obligations under the Due
Process Clause.346 Accordingly, Congress's power to enforce the States'
remedial obligations under Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is not diminished by the availability of federal-court
remedies.349
Because the procedural component of the Due Process Clause puts
remedial obligations on the States, Congress can use Section 5 to
"enforce" those remedial obligations by "appropriate" legislation.3 ° To
be "appropriate," however, the legislation must be tailored to remedying
or preventing the States' failure to meet their remedial obligations.3"' A
federal law may not satisfy this "tailoring" requirement if, instead of
344. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
345. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, _, 121 S. Ct. 955, 963-68 (2001); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-91 (2000);
Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672-75 (1999);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636-48 (1999);
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,516-35 (1997).
346. See supra notes 178-248, 260-325 and accompanying text (discussing States' remedial
obligations under the doctrine of procedural due process).
347 See supra Part IV.D.
348. See infra notes 392-94 and accompanying text.
349. See infra note 393 and accompanying text.
350. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519
(1997) (stating that "[tihe 'provisions of this article,' to which § 5 refers, include the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," and holding that Congress had power under Section 5 to
enforce Free Exercise Clause, which had been held to be incorporated into Due Process Clause).
351. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639
(1999) (stating that, "for Congress to invoke § 5, it must identify conduct transgressing the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying
or preventing such conduct").
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regulating state remedial procedures, the law regulates state conduct that
could give rise to remedial obligations. The "appropriate" way for
Congress to remedy or prevent defective state remedial procedures
would ordinarily be to regulate the remedial procedures themselves." 2
This appears to be why the Court in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank 53 concluded that the
federal statute challenged there exceeded Congress's power under
Section 5.354 Florida Prepaid concerned the federal Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act ("Patent Remedy Act," or
"Act"). The Act made States civilly liable for infringing patents."' The
Court in Florida Prepaid observed that a State's infringement of a patent
could cause a deprivation of property, if the infringement was
intentional." 6 Thus, the Patent Remedy Act targeted State conduct that
could give rise to state remedial obligations under the doctrine of
procedural due process. The Court added, however, that, "[in procedural
due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally
protected interest... is not in itself unconstitutional; what is
unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process
of law.' 357 Thus, a State's intentional infringement of patents violates
procedural due process "only where the State provides no remedy, or
only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement
of their patent. 358  Nonetheless, Congress "barely considered the
availability of state remedies for patent infringement" when it was
drafting the Patent Remedy Act.35 9 As a result, the statute that Congress
enacted was not limited to "cases involving arguable constitutional
352. The qualification in the text ("ordinarily") reflects that Congress can use Section 5 to enact
"reasonably prophylactic legislation" in response to "[d]ifficult and intractable" violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88, 91 (2000).
353. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
354. Id. at 646-47.
355. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994); see also Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 631-32 (describing
Patent Remedy Act).
356. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641-42 (holding that patents "are surely included within the
'property' of which no person may be deprived by a State without due process of law" and Court
knew of "no reason why Congress might not legislate against their deprivation without due process
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"); id. at 645 (observing that, although negligent official
conduct "does not 'deprive' [a] person of property within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause .... [a]ctions predicated on direct patent infringement [under federal statute] ... do not
require any showing of intent to infringe").
357. Id. at 642-43 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)) (bracketed text and
ellipsis added by Court in Florida Prepaid).
358. Id. at 643.
359. Id.
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violations '3 60 and hence did not fall within Section 5. In short, the Patent
Remedy Act was not "appropriate" legislation for enforcing the
procedural Due Process Clause because it was aimed at state conduct that
could give rise to remedial obligations under the Clause-i.e., at the
States' infringement of patents-rather than at state conduct that violated
those remedial obligations-i.e., at the States' failure adequately to avoid
or remedy their intentional patent infringements.36 '
I respectfully disagree with commentators who have criticized Florida
Prepaid for failing to analyze the Patent Remedy Act as a law that
enforced substantive due process.36 2 It is true that the plaintiff in Florida
360. Id. at 646.
361. A similar defect led the Court in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, (2000), to hold
that a federal statute exceeded Section 5. Morrison concerned the federal Violence Against Women
Act ("VAWA"), 42 U.S.C. § 13981. The VAWA authorized a private civil action against people
who committed gender-motivated crimes of violence. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605-07 (describing the
VAWA). The federal government defended the VAWA as a way of enforcing the rights of the
victims of such crimes to the equal protection of state laws that proscribed gender-motivated, violent
crimes. See id. at 619. The Court recognized that, when Congress enacted the VAWA, Congress had
ample evidence of "pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of gender-
motivated violence." Id. The problem was that the VAWA did not target this systemic bias. Instead,
the VAWA targeted the underlying (private) conduct that gave rise to the States' obligation to
provide the protection of their laws on an equal basis. Id. at 626 (observing that the VAWA "is not
aimed at proscribing discrimination by [state] officials" involved, for example, "in investigating or
prosecuting" gender-motivated crimes but at individuals who committed those crimes). A State's
duty under the Equal Protection Clause to afford the protections of its laws on an equal basis, like its
remedial obligations under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is procedural in
nature; it concerns the way substantive laws are enforced. Florida Prepaid suggests that Congress
ordinarily cannot use Section 5 to regulate state conduct that could give rise to remedial obligations,
but that does not in and of itself violate the Fourteenth Amendment; similarly, Morrison indicates
that Congress cannot use Section 5 to regulate private conduct that could give rise to equal-
protection obligations, but that does not in and of itself violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus,
there is a plausible rationale for the Section 5 holding in Morrison, and it is a rationale that is
consistent with the holding of Florida Prepaid. Whether the holding in Morrison reflects too narrow
a conception of Section 5 power (as Professor Caminker has persuasively argued) is a different
matter. See Evan H. Caminker, Private Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5, 33 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1351, 1353 (2000) (arguing that "[n]either text, precedent, nor federalism values guiding
constitutional interpretation persuasively support limiting Congress's Section 5 powers" in the way
in which the Court did in Florida Prepaid); see also Richard E. Levy, Federalism: The Next
Generation, 33 LOY, L.A. L. REv. 1629, 1643 & n.59 (2000) (arguing that Congress may be able to
use Section 5 to ban possession of weapons in public schools on the theory that state's inaction in the
face of the problem constitutes discrimination or causes a deprivation of life or liberty without due
process); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 477 (2000) (contending that Court has
treated Congress's power under Section 5 with unusual "suspicion and hostility").
362. See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1011, 1061 (2000) (criticizing opinion in Florida Prepaid for its failure "even
to advert to the question" whether state's patent infringement should be analyzed under doctrine of
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Prepaid was not complaining about the procedure by which the State
infringed its patent;363 the plaintiff wanted a remedy for that
infringement. Yet, as previously discussed, a State's obligation to
remedy an erroneous deprivation of property, including a State's
intentional infringement of a patent, stems from the procedural
component of the Due Process Clause.3 Thus, a plaintiff's desire for a
remedy for a State's deprivation of his or her property interest does not
automatically identify the plaintiffs claim as one grounded in
substantive due process.
Likewise, a plaintiffs claim that a deprivation of property was
erroneous does not automatically make that claim a substantive due
process claim. To plead a substantive due process claim, the plaintiff
must allege that the deprivation was not merely erroneous, but so flawed
that it was "arbitrary in the constitutional sense."36 The plaintiff in
Florida Prepaid did not allege constitutional arbitrariness. 66 The
plaintiff did assert that the State's infringement of its patent violated the
federal law against patent infringement. 6 ' That assertion was probably
correct; even after Florida Prepaid, States probably still have to obey the
federal patent laws.3 6' Even so, a State's infringement of a patent
substantive due process); Michael Wells, "'Available State Remedies" and the Fourteenth
Amendment: Comments on Fla. Prepaid v. Coll. Say. Bank, 33 LOY. L.A. L. RE v. 1665, 1667, 1669-
76 (2000) [hereinafter Wells, Available State Remedies] (arguing that "[a] procedural due process
reading of Florida Prepaid's adequate state remedies prong presents formidable analytical
difficulties" and that, read as a decision about substantive due process, Florida Prepaid conflicts
with Home Telephone).
363. See Wells, Available State Remedies, supra note 362, at 1675 (asserting that "the nature of
the underlying claim in Florida Prepaid seems to be substantive rather than procedural").
364. See supra notes 261-97 and accompanying text.
365. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) ("[O]nly the most egregious
official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.") (internal quotation marks
omitted); Fallon, Confusions, supra note 190, at 310 ("In its commonest form, substantive due
process doctrine reflects the simple but far-reaching principle.., that government cannot be
arbitrary.") (footnotes omitted).
366. The plaintiff in Florida Prepaid contended that the State's infringement was "willful." Fla.
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 632-33. It is doubtful that even most "willful" infringements would violate
substantive due process, given the Court's repeated insistence that "only the most egregious official
conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
367. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 631 ("College Savings claims that, in the course of administering
its tuition prepayment program, Florida Prepaid directly and indirectly infringed College Savings'
patent. College Savings brought an infringement action under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) ... ").
368. The Court in Florida Prepaid concluded "that the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 647. This conclusion does not resolve whether, to
the extent that the Act imposes only a substantive obligation on States not to infringe patents, it can
be justified under the Patent Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In Alden, the Court clearly
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ordinarily would violate substantive due process (as distinguished from
violating the federal patent laws) only if the infringement were "arbitrary
in the constitutional sense"-i.e., "egregious." 369 And the fact that a
State's conduct violates the federal patent laws does not make the
conduct "arbitrary" for purposes of substantive due process (or otherwise
unconstitutional).37 Congress cannot use Section 5 to alter the Court's
definition of "arbitrary" for purposes of substantive due process any
more than Congress can use Section 5 to alter the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause.37'
The analysis is the same if one treats the plaintiffs claim in Florida
Prepaid as alleging that, by infringing the plaintiff s patent, the State was
taking private property for a public use. 372 A State's taking of private
property for public use does not violate the Just Compensation Clause, as
applicable to States under the Fourteenth Amendment. 73 Instead, a
violation of the Just Compensation Clause occurs only if the State fails to
pay just compensation for the taking.3 74 Thus, the assertion of a taking
believed that States continue to have an obligation to pay the wages prescribed in the FLSA, even
though they cannot be sued under that statute for retroactive monetary relief. See Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 754-60 (1999) (discussing alternative ways of enforcing federal laws against the
States and observing that Maine "has not questioned Congress's power to prescribe substantive rules
of federal law to which it must comply"). By parity of reasoning, States would also still have to obey
the federal patent laws.
369. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846.
370. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643 ("[Al State's infringement of a patent .. does not by
itself violate the Constitution.").
371. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (stating that "Congress does not
enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is" and holding that, as applied to States,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (1996), exceeded
Congress's enforcement power under Section 5, because Act "appears to attempt a substantive
change in constitutional protections.").
372. In fact, the plaintiff in Florida Prepaid did argue that the Patent Remedy Act fell within
Congress's power under Section 5 because it was "appropriate" for enforcing the States' obligations
under the Just Compensation Clause. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641-42. The Court declined to
consider that argument, finding no evidence that, in enacting the Patent Remedy Act, Congress
intended to rely on the Just Compensation Clause. See id. at 642 n.7; see also Kidalov & Seamon,
supra note 196, at 73-75 (discussing significance of Court's refusal to address thejust-compensation
defense of the statute).
373. See, e.g., First English Evangelical 'Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 315 (1987) (stating that Just Compensation Clause "does not prohibit the taking of private
property").
374. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734 (1997) (stating that
"only takings without 'just compensation' infringe" the Just Compensation Clause). A person whose
patent had been taken for public use by the State could sue the State in state court alleging a claim in
inverse condemnation under First English. See supra notes 19-52 and accompanying text
(discussing First English). The claim would not be barred by the federal statute that gives federal
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does not establish a violation of a State's substantive obligation under the
Fourteenth Amendment to pay just compensation. Of course, a State
violates the procedural component of the Due Process Clause if it fails to
provide adequate procedures for paying just compensation.37 But
violations of neither the substantive obligation to pay just compensation
nor the procedural obligation to have a scheme for doing so are targeted
by a federal statute that creates civil liability for all state infringements of
patents, even those for which the State provides just compensation. Such
a statute would not target state violations of the substantive obligation to
pay just compensation, because state takings of private property for
public use do not violate that component. unless they go
uncompensated.376 And the statute would not target state violations of
district courts exclusive jurisdiction of cases "arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,"
28 U.S.C. § 1338, because the case would arise under the Constitution, not under the patent laws.
See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (determining
that patent owner could assert taking claim against State in state court, notwithstanding federal
court's exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement claims); Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Dep't of
Transp., 626 So.2d 1333 (Fla. 1993) (same); Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual
Property, 73 S. CAL. L REv. 1161, 1163 n.5 (2000) (same).
375. See, eg., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 717 (1999)
(stating that government violates the Constitution "either by denying just compensation in fact or by
refusing to provide procedures through which compensation may be sought"). In Part IV, I argue
that a State can establish adequate procedures for payment of just compensation without waiving
immunity in its own courts, but, if (and only if) it fails to do so, its use of sovereign immunity to
prevent the recovery of just compensation would violate the procedural component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In my view, this argument accords with the Court's
precedent, both old and new. I therefore respectfully disagree with Professor Vdzquez's view that the
Court's decision in Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999), can be read to mean "that a state's insistence on sovereign immunity is never a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Professor Vhzquez stated,
[T]he Court in College Savings Bank[, 527 U.S. at 675,] indicated that the statute involved in
that case was a prophylactic measure because it was a prohibition of States' sovereign-immunity
claims, which are not in themselves a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This suggests
that a state's insistence on sovereign immunity is never a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment ....
Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 859, 898
(2000) [hereinafter Vizquez, Schizophrenia] (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted;
emphasis added). College Savings indicates only that a State's reliance on sovereign immunity does
not necessarily violate the Fourteenth Amendment, a principle that is fully consistent with the
analysis in this Article. See Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675 (remarking that State's assertion of
sovereign-immunity defenses to patent-infringement claims "are not in themselves violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment").
376. Professors Heald and Wells assert that most patent infringements by the States are caused by
officials who lack the power to exercise eminent domain. See Heald & Wells, supra note 19, at 870-
71, 888. They appear to believe that the infringement of a patent by a state official who lacks
eminent-domain power would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if the infringement constituted a
taking ofproperty for which just compensation was due. Id. at 888 (contrasting such an infringement
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the procedural component of the Due Process Clause, because it would
operate without regard to whether the state had an adequate procedure
for paying just compensation for its takings.377
to a State's "proper" exercise of authority to take private property for public use). Based on that
belief, they find a close "fit" between a federal statute abrogating state sovereign immunity from
patent-infringement claims and the prevention or remediation of violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. If I understand their argument correctly, I respectfully disagree. It is true that a
state official's infringement of a patent could immediately give rise to a cause of action in inverse
condemnation, if the infringement constituted a taking of private property for public use. See id. at
888. A cause of action in inverse condemnation is not the same, however, as a cause of action for a
violation of the Just Compensation Clause. See Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 196, at 51-52. A
cause of action in inverse condemnation arises as soon as a taking occurs, whereas a cause of action
for a violation of the Just Compensation Clause does not arise until the State fails to pay just
compensation for the taking. See. e.g., Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985) (recognizing that "a property owner has not suffered a violation of
the Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain just
compensation through the procedures provided by the State for obtaining such compensation").
Thus, a state official's infringement of a patent does not violate the Constitution just because it
causes a taking of private property for public use. This conclusion is not altered by the official's lack
of eminent-domain power. As long as the official's act of infringement fell within the general scope
of his or her authority--i.e., as long as it was not ultra vires-the official's conduct could cause a
taking for which just compensation was due. See Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United States,
146 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1998). If the official's infringement was ultra vires, it could not
constitute a taking for which just compensation is due. See id. If the infringement was "arbitrary in
the constitutional sense," Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (internal quotes omitted), it could violate
substantive due process, and be actionable on that basis. As discussed in the text, however, the
official's conduct would not be constitutionally arbitrary merely because it violated federal patent
laws.
377. Because Florida Prepaid addressed Congress's power to enforce the States' procedural due
process obligations, I respectfully disagree with commentary suggesting that Florida Prepaid
conflicts with Home Telephone, which was a substantive due process case. See David L. Shapiro,
The 1999 Trilogy: What is Good Federalism?, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 753, 757 (2000). In Home
Telephone, a phone company claimed that telephone rates set by a city violated the Fourteenth
Amendment because they were so low as to be confiscatory. Home Tel. & Tel Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 281 (1913). This claim asserted a violation of substantive due process, not
procedural due process. See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from
the Controversy Over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 255 (1984)
(identifying substantive due process as doctrine underlying Court's decisions reviewing
reasonableness of utility rates). The Court concluded in Home Telephone that the company had
adequately alleged a substantive due process violation, even if the challenged rates violated state law
and could have been set aside on that basis. Home Tel., 227 U.S. at 282-95. This conclusion reflects
that a violation of substantive due process can occur before state remedies for the violation have
been exhausted. That principle does not conflict with Florida Prepaid. Florida Prepaid reflects that,
unlike a State's violation of substantive due process, a State's violation of procedural due process
sometimes does not occur until after adequate state remedies have been exhausted. See Fla. Prepaid,
527 U.S. at 642-43 (relying on cases involving "procedural due process claims"); see also Zinermon
v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990) (explaining that violation of substantive due process "is
complete when the wrongful action is taken," whereas violation of procedural due process "is not
complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide
due process.") If a plaintiff can plead a violation of substantive due process, the plaintiff can seek a
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This explanation of Florida Prepaid as a decision about Congress's
power to enforce the procedural component of the Due Process Clause
should show that the decision does not necessarily "undo" the Court's
decision in Alden v. Maine.37 In Alden, state employees sued the State
of Maine in a state court in Maine for backpay under the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a statute enacted under Congress's Article
I, Commerce Clause power." 9 The Court in Alden held that the suit was
barred by the State's immunity in its own courts and that Congress could
not use its Article I powers to abrogate that immunity.38° Professor
Vizquez has argued that these holdings may be insignificant if a state
employee's right to the wages prescribed by the FLSA constitutes a
"property" interest protected by the doctrine of procedural due process.38
The premise of this argument is that the States' use of sovereign
immunity to defeat a state-court action for backpay under the FLSA
would violate the Due Process Clause. 82
It is not necessarily true, however, that a State would violate the Due
Process Clause by using sovereign immunity to bar a state-court action
against it for backpay under the FLSA. To begin with, a State's violation
of the FLSA is no more tantamount to a violation of substantive due
process than is a State's violation of the federal patent laws. Neither sort
of violation is necessarily "arbitrary" as the Court has defined that term
remedy for that violation in a federal-court lawsuit-under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for example-even if
an adequate state remedy was available for the violation and even if, as this Article has argued, the
existence of an adequate state remedy would be required by the doctrine of procedural due process.
As discussed in the text, however, the plaintiff in Florida Prepaid did not allege a substantive due
process violation.
378. 527 U.S. 706 (1999), discussed supra notes 140-77 and accompanying text; see Vdzquez,
Alden Trilogy, supra note 18, at 1928 (asserting that Florida Prepaid "may contain the seed of
Alden's substantial undoing").
379. Alden, 527 U.S. at 711 (describing background of lawsuit); see also Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537-56 (1985) (analyzing FLSA as exercise of Congress's
power under Commerce Clause).
380. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754.
381. Vdzquez, Alden Trilogy, supra note 18, at 1974-80 (arguing that comparison of Alden and
Florida Prepaid leads to conclusion "either that, under the holding of Florida Prepaid, the Alden
plaintiffs would have been entitled under the Due Process Clause to the relief that the Court in Alden
denied them, or that the Court now rejects its 'new property' jurisprudence").
382. Vizquez, Alden Trilogy, supra note 18, at 1974 (asserting that, if the right to wages under
FLSA constituted property, plaintiffs in Alden "would have been entitled under the Due Process
Clause to the relief the Court in Alden denied them"). The plaintiffs in Alden sought back pay for
approximately a four-year period. See Joint Appendix at 50-51, Alden (No. 98-436) (unpublished
decision of state trial court in Alden case, stating that plaintiffs "are seeking damages for the period
of December 21, 1989 to February 6, 1994").
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for purposes of substantive due process.383 It is true that, if the right of a
state employee to the wages prescribed by the FLSA is, like a patent, a
property interest, a State's intentional violation of the FLSA would
constitute a deprivation of property.384 The State would therefore have a
procedural due process obligation to establish a system for ensuring that
its payment of wages complied with the FLSA. That system would have
to ensure accurate payment of wages and a way to remedy erroneous
payments.
The question remains what remedy the State would have to provide
when its system detected a post-payment error. That question is one of
procedural due process, for reasons already discussed. Procedural due
process might generally require retroactive compensation from the State
for FLSA violations; the Court's tax cases arguably support that
requirement.38 If the Due Process Clause did require retroactive
compensation from the State for FLSA violations, then Alden would
indeed lose much significance.
It is far from clear, however, that the Due Process Clause would
require retroactive compensation from the State for violations of the
FLSA.5 6 One could plausibly argue that prospective correction of the
383. See supra text accompanying notes 365-71, supra (explaining why State's violation of
patent laws does not violate substantive due process).
384. An employee's right to the wages prescribed by the FLSA appears to be "property" as the
Court has usually defined the term for purposes of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (stating that property interest exists for due process purposes if
"existing rules or understandings that stem from" sources of law independent of the Constitution
support "legitimate claims of entitlement" to a monetary benefit). In a companion case to Florida
Prepaid, however, the Court appeared to adopt a narrower definition of "property" in holding that
the Lanham Act, 15 U S.C. § 1125(a), did not give the plaintiff a "property" interest in being free
from a state entity's making a false statement about a product that the State marketed in competition
with the plaintiff's product. See Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 673-75 (1999). To reconcile College Savings with precedent, the result in that case is
best understood to reflect that, when a State makes false claims about its own product, any resulting
competitive injury is too indirect to cause the owner of a competing product to suffer a "deprivation"
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 675. Cf Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,
285 (1980) (State's decision to parole person who murdered plaintiffs' decedent did not "deprive"
decedent of life because murder was "too remote a consequence"). Admittedly, this was not the
reason the Court gave for its decision in College Savings.
385. See supra notes 217-26 and 300-14 (discussing Court's tax cases); see also Brief for
Petitioners at 29-31, Alden (No. 98-436) (arguing that Court's tax cases supported conclusion that
plaintiffs were entitled to retroactive relief for State's FLSA violations as a matter of due process).
386. Even if the Due Process Clause does require retroactive compensation from the State for
violations of the FLSA, the Clause does not necessarily require the State to make that remedy
available in its courts. Instead, the State may be able to satisfy the Due Process Clause by creating an
adequate nonjudicial scheme for awarding that compensation.
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error that led to the violations, such as through injunctive relief, would
satisfy the Due Process Clause.3"7 Alternatively, one could argue that
due process requires retroactive compensation only for egregious
violations and, even then, only compensation payable by the officials
responsible for the violations. These arguments would emphasize the
difference between a State's erroneous collection of a tax-which
deprives people of money (or other property) that they already have
received-and a State's failure to pay the prescribed wage-which
deprives people of money that they have not yet received.388 In addition
to this difference between the individual interest at stake in the two
settings, there may be other differences that justify interpreting the Due
Process Clause to mandate different remedies for erroneous taxation and
erroneous payment of wages. For example, perhaps States have greater
incentives to avoid erroneous wage payments than they do to avoid
erroneous tax collections.389 The point is that, although the procedural
Due Process Clause may require States to remedy its violations of the
FLSA, the Clause does not necessarily require that remedy to take the
form of a state-court award of retroactive monetary relief payable out of
the state treasury, which is the only type of remedy that implicates the
sovereign immunity recognized in Alden.39 The broader point is that,
387. But ef. Jackson, The Supreme Court, supra note 18, at 113 (arguing that Court's precedent
barring federal courts from awarding retroactive monetary relief against States for federal statutory
violations might be justified if state courts were available to grant that relief).
388. Cf. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 10-11 (1979) ("[Tlhere
is a human difference between losing what one has and not getting what one wants.") (quoting
Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1296 (1975)); Cf. also Lujan
v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, .... , 121 S. Ct. 1446, 1451 (2001) (distinguishing, for
due-process purposes, between someone who is "presently entitled either to exercise ownership
dominion over real or personal property, or to pursue a gainful occupation" on the one hand, from
someone with a claim for payment under a contract); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
282-83 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.)
("Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job."); see
generally Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 19, at 967 nn.298-99 (citing studies suggesting that people
find loss of existing object or interest more painful than failure to acquire an equivalent object or
interest, and proposing definition of "property" for due process purposes that reflects that
difference).
389. This is, of course, speculative. People, and especially businesses, can vote with their feet by
leaving or avoiding States with defective tax systems, an ability that may create a disincentive to
erroneous taxation. Similarly, States might be deterred from violating the FLSA because they
compete for employees with both private employers and other public sector employers. Cf. Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 18, at 1828 (arguing that threat of refunds "are surely useful, and indeed may be
necessary, to keep state officials within the bounds of law").
390. Professor Vizquez believes that the Court may have decided Alden without considering the
implications of its decision in that case for its decision the same day in Florida Prepaid, and that the
"most important[]" cause of this oversight was that "the litigants in Alden failed to invoke the due
process principle." Vizquez, Alden Trilogy, supra note 18, at 1929-30. In faimess to the plaintiffs in
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although due process can override the States' immunity in their own
courts, it will not always do so; the occurrence of an override depends
on, among other things, whether such an override is necessary to achieve
the accuracy demanded by the doctrine of procedural due process.39
Finally, the due-process analysis proposed in this Article clarifies that
Congress's use of Section 5 to remedy or prevent violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not depend on the availability of federal-
court remedies for those violations.392 As discussed above, the federal
courts cannot help a State meet its remedial obligations under the
procedural component of the Due Process Clause.393 The presence of
federal-court remedies is therefore irrelevant to Congress's power to
ensure that the States themselves meet their remedial obligations, just as
the absence of federal-court remedies is irrelevant to whether the Due
Process Clause requires the States themselves to provide those remedies.
Furthermore, when a State violates, not its remedial obligations, but its
substantive obligations under the Due Process Clause-for example, by
violating substantive due process restrictions on arbitrary state conduct
Alden, however, it should be noted that they did make a due process argument. See Brief for
Petitioners at 29-32, Alden (No. 98-436) (relying on Court's decisions about States' constitutional
obligation to refund illegally collected taxes to argue that "[s]tate action taking a person's money or
other property in violation of governing federal constraints and denying that person all state court
redress for that loss is, most assuredly, a plain affront to due process").
391. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (stating that procedural due process serves
systemic goal of enforcing rule of law and goal of protecting individual's interest in life, liberty, and
property).
392. But cf Vdzquez, Schizophrenia, supra note 375, at 893. Professor Vizquez believes that the
Court's recent decisions on Section 5 "appear to hold that an abrogation is valid under Section
5. . . only if a withdrawal of Eleventh Amendment immunity is 'genuinely necessary' to assure
compliance by the states with their federal obligations." Id.; see also id. at 895 (stating that Court's
recent Section 5 decisions "suggest that, at a minimum, Congress must consider the adequacy
of... alternative means before it resorts to means barred by the Eleventh Amendment"). Professor
Vfzquez bases this reading primarily on the Court's statement in College Savings Bank that
Congress may use Section 5 to abrogate state sovereign immunity where "genuinely necessary" to
prevent States from violating the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 861 & n. I1 (quoting Coll. Say.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999)). Professor
Vdzquez then juxtaposes this statement with Justice Scalia's statement in another case that federal-
court remedies already supply "the necessary judicial means to assure [state] compliance" with the
Constitution. See id. at 859-60 & n.2 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,33 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Based on these statements, he suggests that the
Court could conclude that Congress never has the power under Section 5 to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, because that step is not genuinely necessary in light of existing federal-court remedies.
See id. at 893 ("If the Court adhered to the supremacy strain [evinced in recent Section 5 decisions],
abrogation would never be appropriate .... "). Contrary to that conclusion, the existence of federal-
court remedies does not diminish Congress's Section 5 power, for reasons discussed in the text.
393. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
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and on state conduct that unduly burdens fundamental liberties-that
substantive violation occurs whether or not there is a remedy in federal
court (or, for that matter, whether or not there is a remedy in state court)
for the violation? The existence of judicial remedies for a State's
violations of its substantive obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment
does not excuse those violations, and it therefore cannot dilute
Congress's power to remedy or prevent them under Section 5.
VI. CONCLUSION
The state courts and the federal courts are not fungible. Each can
enable its respective sovereign to meet the remedial obligations of the
Due Process Clause. By the same token, neither the state courts nor the
federal courts can discharge the remedial obligations of the other
sovereign. Thus, when a State fails to meet its remedial obligations, it
can subject itself, in its own courts and without its consent, to suits that
would be barred from federal court by sovereign immunity. One such
situation arises when the State violates its obligation under the Due
Process Clause to create a "reasonable, certain, and adequate" procedure
to pay just compensation for private property that the State has taken for
public use.
394. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278,282-95 (1913) (holding that
existence of state-court remedies for alleged violation of Fourteenth Amendment did not defeat
claim); see also Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 204-05 (1924) (holding that
plaintiff asserted present injury by claiming that state agency's rate order was confiscatory and
therefore violated Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
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